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ABSTRACT 
 
Taxation of dividends changed during 2005. This creates pressure for the mar-
kets to change the valuation of the dividends, which can be witnessed by ob-
serving the ex-dividend day ratios. Ex-ratios give information concerning the 
affect on the markets. Historically the dividend policies have required high 
commitment and thus there are only small changes in the actual payments. 
 
Study of the change in the market valuation was done through usage of two 
different types of ex-day ratios. These ratios were calculated for the whole sam-
ple and for three different types of dividend payment amounts labelled as low, 
medium and high. Years from 2001 to 2007 were included in the data, in certain 
situations the year 2005 was dropped, because of its nature of being a transition 
period.  
 
It was clear from this study that there is statistically significant affect on ex-
dividend day ratios. When looking at the different dividend payment groups 
the results are puzzling, since the research hypothesis failed. High dividend 
paying group was not affected according to the tax hypothesis instead it went 
to the opposite direction. Strongest tax affect was found in the low and medium 
dividend paying groups. 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: ex-day, dividends, dividend policy, payout policy, 
taxation 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Tax changes create unique opportunities to test theories in practise, which re-
quire certain empirical settings. The tax change of 2004 in Finland was begun by 
a ruling of European Court of Justice. The Court ruled in favour of Manninen 
(case C-319/02). The actual case was released in September 2004. The old Fin-
nish tax system was deemed incompatible with one of the principles of EU, 
however the Finnish government had already decided to move away from the 
old imputation credit system. From the beginning of year 2005 the new system 
was in place. As these changes are uncommon it is very interesting seeing what 
kind of affect these changes will have on corporate payout policies. 
 
Change in the taxation might effect dividend payments, which are big part of 
firms payout policy. The payout policy, also consist of investment and repur-
chase decisions. Two different types of payments that the company can make to 
its owners, therefore are through repurchase and dividends agreements. Divi-
dends seem to have lost part of their attraction in the resent years and the re-
purchases have begun to be more common (Allen et al. 2002, Fama & French 
2001). The attractiveness of the repurchases is partially tax-driver, given the tax 
benefits associated with this payment relative to dividends. The purpose of this 
study is narrowed down to concentrate only on the dividends, because the 
taxes affect both, and repurchases are seen as other way of distributing profits. 
 
First research done with the payout policy was made by John Lintner (1956). He 
studied the dividend decisions and dividend policies of different companies. 
And drew conclusions about the decisions of the managers concerning these 
polices. His research was remade in the 21st century by Brav, Graham, Harvey 
and Michaely (2005), which also studied repurchases that were not typical dur-
ing 1956 when Lintner conducted his study. Shortly after Miller and Modigliani 
(1961) created a theory about dividend payment irrelevance, which has caused 
dispute ever since. The theory however created strong background, which has 
influenced and created new questions to be answered. Through these new ques-
tions it has created even more studies in the field of payout research. 
 
Elton and Gruber (1970) were the first to examine effect of the taxation through 
using ex-dividend method. They also created a new kind of method to test the 
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clientele hypotheses, which had been created by Modigliani and Miller (1961). 
There has been lot of critique concerning their first study (Allen et al. 2002, 
Breadly & Myers 2000). The classical study was revisited by Elton, Gruber and 
Blake (2005). This time they study close-end funds, which have dividends that 
are taxable and non-taxable depending on the fund. The basic test that Elton 
and Gruber (1970) created has evolved a lot and has been used as a basis for 
studies around the world in Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, United Kingdoms, 
Canada, Finland, Germany and many other nations. 
 
1.1.  Definitions 
 
Ex-dividend day. 
 
During this day the stock goes ex-dividend. The dividend has been paid before 
this date and purchasing the stock after this day means that the owner will not 
receive the dividend. The dividend payment is not fully linked to the change of 
ownership, since in most cases the actual records used to pay the dividends are 
taken from 3 days before the actual payment. Therefore those owners, which 
want to receive the dividends have to be owners of the stock before this time 
period. 
 
Cum-dividend day. 
 
This indicates the date during, which the dividend has not been paid. And pur-
chasing the stock during this day will grant the owner the right to the dividend 
payment. 
 
Ex-dividend day ratio. 
 
Describes the ratio calculated using different types of equations to give an indi-
cation of how the market has valued the dividend payment. The simplest ver-
sion is calculated by extracting the ex-dividend day prices from the cum-
dividend day price divided by cum-dividend price. 
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1.2. Description of the study 
 
This study is constructed as follows; Chapter 2 the problem is stated and the 
methodology used in this study is described. The following Chapter 3 repre-
sents the different types of literatures, which give description of the different 
types of studies that have been conducted in the field. The overall picture of the 
payout theory is explained and several different studies around the world are 
represented to give better view on how the research has been done in the past. 
Chapter 4 show the Finnish dividend tax system and the historical develop-
ments. Description of the data is shown in Chapter 5 with tables of the data. 
Chapter 6 includes the empirical study and results on the different equations 
used. The last Chapter 7 concludes the research and gives recommendations for 
future researchers.  
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2. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Several different methods can be used to study specified affects on the markets. 
Affect of the taxation has been studied by using different types of abnormal re-
turns, which have been found around the ex-dividend days (see Lasfer 1995; 
Blouing, Smith & Shackleford 2004). Ex-dividend day ratios have been used 
through several different formulas (see Elton & Gruber 1970; Poterba & Sum-
mers 1984; Sorjonen 2000; Bell & Jenkinson 2002; Allen & Michaely 2002). This 
chapter will explain the methods used in the study. The research problem is 
explained in the 2.2 chapter, and also the hypothesis is represented in the chap-
ter 2.3. 
 
 
2.1. Motivation 
 
Changes in the taxation are not common and therefore such incidents are an 
ample opportunity to test, if the theories of tax effect can be confirmed in 
Finland. The Finnish markets have been found to differ from those of United 
States (Hietala 1990). Finland has followed the European trend, the imputation 
systems are being dissolved in many European countries, and this gives an op-
portunity to test out tax theory on the Finnish markets.  
 
There are several reasons why this topic has been chosen. First, the tax reform 
issue has been dealt a lot in the Finnish media and is therefore very actual topic. 
Second, it is really interesting to see if companies actually change their dividend 
policy because of the reform, also investors reaction to the changes in dividends 
and how those are valued. During the old system there were restricted and un-
restricted stocks, which Hietala (1990) found to differ; the valuation of restricted 
dividends was low compared to the unrestricted (also see Hietala & Keloharju 
1995, Liljeblom, Löflund & Hedvall 2001).  
 
The system was changed and there were no restrictions left, however the old 
imputation system was still used, which gave private individual investors royal 
dividend bonuses compared to other investors. Now that this system has been 
removed it is very interesting to see how the market reacts to such change. This 
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system, also might lead the domestic investors to invest more of their money in 
foreign companies. Research has shown that dividends have a lot of informa-
tion content, increasing the dividend signals good news about future cash flow 
while dividend cuts sends signal of bad news (Lintner 1956, Brav et al. 2005). 
Managers are more interested in the change of the dividend, not its actual 
amount, and are very cautious in altering the dividend especially in reducing it. 
Because of the manager’s unwillingness to increase dividends, it will be inter-
esting to see the results, since the Finnish tax change starts with a transition pe-
riod. During this time the dividend taxation is lower than after the whole 
change. 
 
2.2. Research problem 
 
Tax change took place in 2004, but the taxes changed for dividends paid during 
2005 dividends are always paid in the following year. Dividends that are paid 
during 2005 are therefore the payout from the profit gathered during 2004. Pur-
pose behind this study is to find out, if the tax change had an affect on inves-
tors’ valuation of dividends, and can notable difference be witnessed depend-
ing on the amount of dividends. Before the change the domestic investors were 
better off than some other investors. However the change did not include all of 
the investors. Taxation of most of the investors was left untouched. The re-
search follows closely the path of Bell and Jenkinson (2002), since they studied a 
country with similar change. Also, Sorjonen (2000) study is followed closed, 
since this study was conducted in Finland. It was performed long ago it will 
guide to how such studies should be done in the Finnish markets. There were 
some differences between the changes which Bell and Jenkinsons studied, since 
in their case the clientele, which were affected were the pension funds, and in 
the Finnish case the affected clients are the individual investors. The pension 
funds had received bonuses from the dividend payments, because of the sys-
tem. After the change they were left gains similar to those of other investors. 
This has been similar in the Finnish markets, since the individuals were better 
of with the imputation tax system and now are more equally treated with the 
other investors. 
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2.3. Hypotheses 
 
This study examines the affect of the dividend tax change that took place in 
2004. For this research the ex-dividend day price changes were chosen as the 
method of testing the effect. This has also been called “bang for the buck” and 
DOR (drop off ratio) in the previous research (see Bernheim and Wantz 1995; 
Bell & Jenkinson 2002). The idea is to test whether the markets value the divi-
dends differently depending on the taxation of dividends. In the research done 
by Bell et al. (2002) the imputation tax touched the biggest group of investors. In 
the Finnish situation the tax changed for the individual investors, who have 
accounted for around 20 percent of the total investors in stocks, in the most re-
cent year 2006 this has fallen down to 18.7 percent (Pörssisäätiö 2005, Pörs-
sisäätiö 2006).  
 
The hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis1: Private investors have heavily invested in stocks with high dividend pay-
ments, therefore the ex-dividend day ratios of these stocks will be affected after the tax 
change. 
 
It has shown that the major part of private investors are highly educated indi-
viduals in Finland (Böckerman 2004). These individuals are well acquainted 
with the terms and have good knowledge of the markets; therefore they will 
mostly want to hold dividend paying companies, because of the preferential 
treatment of dividends prior to the tax change. After the tax change these pri-
vate investors will also start buying other types of stocks in larger quantities. 
Investors will change their portfolios to include more of the low and medium 
dividend paying stocks, since the dividends payments are now taxed at higher 
rates oppose to capital gains, which were left untouched by the tax change. 
Dividends of high dividend paying stocks will be valued lower thereby affect-
ing the ex-dividend ratios of these stocks. The ratios will fall, due to the change 
in the ownership.  
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2.4. Methodology 
 
Theory has clearly shown that taxation affects the valuation of dividend pay-
ments; however there has been strong arguing about the validity of this re-
search (Allen et al. 2002).  There have been several studies that have represented 
similar results, which have supported the tax affect found from the ex-dividend 
day studies (see Lamdin & Hiemstra 1993; Lasfer 1995; Sorjonen 2000; Bell et al. 
2002).  
 
This study uses OLS regression analysis. First the study was performed on the 
equation (10), which represents the classical study bone by Elton and Gruber. 
Equations used to study the ex-dividend day effect are the (22) and (24) for the 
Bell and Jenkinson (2002) and (21) for the Sorjonen (2000). Equation (22) was use 
for the market adjustment. Two different studies were conducted. First the 
equations were used to compare differences between two different sets of years. 
Base cases were the years between 2001 and 2004 before the tax change, which 
were compared with 2005 to 2007 and 2006 to 2007. The year 2005 was dropped 
out  in the second group of years, since during this year the tax change was fa-
vourable still to the individual owners, however the taxes were higher than be-
fore 2005. Companies were also separated into three different categories de-
pending on the amount of dividends that they have paid during the study 
(Elton & Gruber 1970; Kalay 1982; Lasfer 1995, Niemi 2004). After this the ex-
dividend day ratios were calculated for different payout groups.  
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
During the last 52 years there has been growing interest towards the payout 
policies that firms maintain. This research began when Lintner did his study  
(1956). It has developed more specifically into study of the different types of 
payouts, and theories around them. This study is focused on the dividends, and 
therefore the different dividend theories will be explained in the following 
chapters. The studies of dividends have been different depending on country, 
since the tax changes have not been the same, however the methods used have 
been similar. There was a study conducted with a country which had no taxa-
tion. These country specific studies were reviewed more closely. 
 
3.1. Dividend Policy   
 
One of the most important decisions of the company takes place when they de-
cide upon the amount of money they should redistribute back to the share-
holder. Also, which form of payment will be utilized to distribute these funds 
and what amount of the income should be distributed. And since these deci-
sions have found to be dynamic Allen et al. (2002) label them as the payout pol-
icy. The word policy is taken since it implies some consistency over time, which 
seems to be one of the biggest influences in the dividend payments, since firms 
clearly do not want to lower the payments. 
 
Before Miller et al. (1961) research, most economists believed that the more 
dividends a firm paid the more valuable it would be. This view was based on 
an extension of the discounted dividend approach used in company valuation. 
In this model the following formula was used to get the V0, which is the value 
of the firm during date 0, and the first dividends are paid one period from now 
at date 1.  Given by the following formula (see Breadly & Myers 2000; Allen et 
al. 2002; Corrado & Bradford 2002): 
 
 
(1) ∑
∞
=
+
=
1
)1(0
t
r
D
t
t
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Allen et al. (2002: 4) describe six empirical observations, which are most impor-
tant when discussing about payout policy. The first is that large corporation 
typically pay out significant percentage of their income to the shareholder, ei-
ther through dividends or repurchases. Secondly, historical data has shown that 
the dividends have been the dominating form of payout; in Graph 1 of propor-
tion of firms with different payouts. Allen et al. (2002) ]  In the mid-1980s the 
repurchase started to make their way through and have become the most im-
portant way of payout. As can be seen clearly from the graph, dividends have 
been in decline and repurchases have taken over; even most of the firms that 
initiate payout do so rather by repurchases than dividends. Thirdly, as show by 
Fama et al. (2001) and Allen et al. (2005) the amount of dividends-paying firms 
has declined in recent years. Fourth, individuals in high tax brackets receive 
large amounts of cash dividends and pay high taxes on the dividends they have 
received. Fifth, corporation smooth dividend payments, i.e. they react slowly to 
changes in the income. This was already found in the Lintner’s (1956) paper. 
Sixth, the reaction in the markets is positive to increase in the either dividends 
or repurchases and vice versa when they announce decreases. 
 
There are several theories, which try to demonstrate why the firms choose to 
payout dividends instead of repurchases. Since 1980 the repurchases have been 
more favoured than dividends, this has been show in several studies Fama & 
French (2001), Allen et al. (2002), and Brav et al. (2005). These theories try to ex-
Graph 1 Proportion of firms with different payouts Allen et al. (2002) 
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plain why the dividends are still paid even though the dividends and repur-
chases seem to be viewed both as a good way of payout. The theories include 
clientele effect, signaling and agency theory. Also, there is a classical theory of 
why firms should not pay dividends, represented by Miller et al. (1961).  
 
The first theory in the field of payout policy was created by John Lintner (1956). 
He studied a diverse group of 28 companies. The companies were selected in a 
broadly defined “industrial” area. The selection was reasoned through the di-
versity of dividend policies that the industry had and also through their greater 
knowledge of dividend policies, since they had a long history of paying divi-
dends. The sample that Lintner selected was not selected for statistical impor-
tance, but rather to see how they differed between others in order to see wide 
array of dividend policies. He did not only study when the firms made changes 
in the dividend polices, but also tried to identify occasions when the changes in 
the dividend policy were contemplated. 
 
The results showed that firms are more concentrated on the change in existing 
rate of dividend payments, rather than the amount of increase in the dividend 
payments. Also, current earnings were viewed as the most dominant part of 
dividend policy. Firms showed reluctance to cut dividends, and also managers 
tried to avoid this through slowly adjusting the dividends if they had a bad 
year. This way they could still keep the change in the dividend payments even 
if the next year would not be as good as the last. This is also called dividend 
smoothing. The managers also indicated that their belief was that unless they 
had compelling reasons, they were required to payout major part of the in-
creases in earnings to the stockholders in the form of dividends. The managers 
thought that market favoured companies with stable dividend policy with a 
premium. Major part of the companies seemed to have a target payout ratio, 
which was show to have a median of 50 %. These companies would slowly ad-
just their increased earnings to reach this target payout ratio. Lintner also found 
out that the management set dividend policy first, and other policies were ad-
justed according to the dividend policy. This meant that the firms that had 
many investment opportunities, which they viewed favourably they would re-
search these opportunities, and if they met the targets the firm would get out-
side funds. (Lintner 1956: 98 – 105.) 
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The field work of Lintner (1956: 107–108) lead him to suggest that following 
model captured most important elements of firms’ dividend policies. For firm i, 
 
(2) 
 
 ri =target payout ratio 
 Pit =current year’s profit after taxes 
 
(3) 
 
∆D it = change in dividend payments 
D*it =desired dividend payment during period t 
 Dit =actual dividend payment during period t 
 ai =a constant relating to dividend growth 
 ci =partial adjustment factor 
 uit =error term 
 
This model (3) was able to explain 85% of the changes in dividends with in the 
group of twenty-eight companies, which Lintner (1956) used.  
 
Brav et al. (2005) re-examined the Lintner study. The research is done through 
interviewing financial executives and conducting in-depth interviews. Main 
issues that Brav et al. (2005: 484) address are roles of taxes, agency considera-
tions and signaling in the decision to pay. Also, they look at why firms prefer 
repurchases over dividends, reasons behind the fact that when new firms initi-
ate payment they seem to prefer repurchases, and look into firms that still pay 
substantial dividends. One of the major goals was to find out how the academic 
research and real-world payout policies met and differed. 
 
Brav et al. (2005) found that the dividend conservatism discovered by Lintner 
(1956) earlier still affected decision making. The management acted conserva-
tively because of the market’s reactions to dividend increases and decreases. 
This might be one of the major reasons why firms still do pay dividends, since 
as Fama et al. (2001) and Allen et al. (2002) have shown the repurchases have 
taken roughly 50 % of the payouts that firms execute. This has been confirmed 
by Brav et al. (2005: 520) “We also find that many of those firms that pay dividends 
wish they did not, saying that if they could start all over again, they would not pay as 
*
( 1)( ) ,it i i it i t itD a c D D u−∆ = + − +  
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much in dividends as they currently do.” This inflexibility created by the market 
has also strong affects to non-payers, since if they choose to start dividend 
payments they also have to act accordingly. 
 
Taxes have low importance to most of the firms; however there is a margin of 
firms that the taxation does matter. There are some firms that actually initiate 
dividend program as their first payout policy (Chetty and Saez 2004, Brav et al. 
2005). In early 2004 there were about six percent of nonpayer’s, which had initi-
ated dividend payments, since the 2003 dividend tax change. Minority of the 
executives in the survey stated that reduced dividend taxation would change 
dividend payments, however two thirds stated that it would probably have no 
effect or that it would not effect at all. Major finding about the taxes was that 
they do matter, but are considered second-order manner. Most of the executives 
said that the taxes are not the dominant factor in choosing different payout pol-
icy, this conclusion was drawn from the research done concerning the timing 
and form of payment. (Brav et al. 2005: 485 – 486.) 
 
Brav et al. (2005: 485) found that firms were most likely to use repurchases in a 
case when there are low amount of good investments opportunities, demands 
made by institutions, plenty of cash on the balance sheet, they see that stocks 
are undervalued by the market, and when they wanted to offset option dilution. 
A major reason why firms prefer repurchases over dividends was the flexibility 
(Brav et al. 2005: 520). When they pay in the form of repurchases they can 
change this level much more flexibly than dividends. Also, executives believe 
that the dividends and repurchase are viewed similarly by most institutional 
investors.  
  
There was strong belief that dividend and repurchase decisions did convey in-
formation to investors. This information did not however appear to be related 
to signaling in the academic sense. The managers strongly opposed the view 
that they paid dividends as a costly way to signal their firms true worth or try-
ing to differentiate them from competitors. There was no evidence that the 
managers consciously made dividend decisions in the form of the signaling 
theories. (Brav et al. 2005: 485) 
  
Repurchase policy was found to be better explained by Miller et al. (1961), since 
the managers focused first on operational and investment decisions and only 
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secondarily on the repurchases. Dividend policy on the other hand was viewed 
opposite. Dividends would not be changed, rather outside funds would be 
raised for investments. In the conclusion Brav et al. (2005) stated rules of the 
payout policy “expect a severe penalty for cutting dividends; do not deviate far from 
competitors; maintain a good credit rating; have a broad and diverse investor base; 
maintain flexibility” they also mentioned that managers should not do anything 
that reduces EPS. (Brav et al. 2005: 520 – 523) 
 
3.2. Dividend Irrelevance 
 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) (here after MM) created a model of perfect and 
complete capital markets, which they used to test how the dividend policy af-
fected share value. Their model included certain rules. These rules were: there 
are no taxes, information asymmetric, no transaction costs, complete markets, 
and rational behaviour. Since there are no taxes, the firms could pay out divi-
dends or repurchase shares, which would be both viewed similarly. It would be 
optimal to do either one, since if there were taxes the firms should choose the 
one with lower taxation. Information asymmetric meant that all participants 
would have same information about the firm including all inside and outsiders. 
Of course this is never the case in reality, since as insider for example, managers 
usually will have better information about the company than outsiders. This 
leads us to the possibility that managers increase dividend payments in order to 
change market price of the shares. Transaction cost influence firms in many 
perspectives. The firms can raise new equity, and shareholder can buy and sell 
shares. Both of these are major part of the model used by MM and since transac-
tion costs normally have a huge effect on the decisions these are ruled out. One 
of the most important rule is that markets are complete. There could be possibil-
ity for firms to increase their value through paying more dividends, if certain 
investors viewed it favourably. In the complete markets there are no differences 
between different levels of dividend payment that firms can choose. With ra-
tional behaviour MM meant that the investors would always prefer more 
wealth to less and would not care about the form of increase in their wealth, 
which could be either cash payments or increased value of shares. Under the 
rules that MM created firms would maximise their value by choosing optimal 
investments. The net payout does not have importance, since firms can adjust 
the dividend level and thereby offset the change in their outstanding shares. 
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This is also similar to investors, since they can produce any level dividend 
payments through appropriate purchase and sale of shares. Therefore, the in-
vestors will not pay premium based on firm’s dividend policy.  
 
Now supposing that there are markets which are perfect and complete capital 
markets, also there are no taxes. The firm value at date t is Vt, which describes 
present value of payouts that include dividends and repurchases. Let us first 
look at the case with two periods, t and t + 1. During the date t, firm has the 
earnings of previous period Et on hand. Firm must make a decision about the 
level of investments, dividends and also the amount of shares to be issued, or 
repurchased. The level of earnings is Et+1(It, θt+1) during time t + 1, which de-
pends on level of investments It and random variable θt+1. Assuming that com-
plete markets pt(θt+1) time t price of consumption in state θt+1.  
  
(4)  
 
 Vt = present value of payouts 
 It = earnings (earned previously) on hand 
 Dt = the level of investment 
 ∆St = the level of dividends 
 
 
Sources and uses of fund identity inform us that in the current period t:  
 
(5) 
 
Using the equation (5) for current payouts, then 
 
(5) 
 
Extending the analysis into more than two periods, then  
 
(6) 
 
(8)  
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From the equation (8) it follows that only thing that matters in the sequence of 
investments It, It+1, … are the only things, which matter when determining the 
firm value. Therefore, the only thing which matters in maximising the firm 
value is choosing the correct investment policy (Miller et al. 1961). (Allen et al. 
2002: 12 – 15). 
 
The view that Millet et al. (1961) created has been contradicted by DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo (2006) claiming that the dividend policy does matter. First of all 
they claim that the assumption made by MM force the first to 100% payout of 
free cash flow, which restricts the different optimal payout policies, which firms 
can choose upon. Retention was not allowed in the original world of MM; how-
ever it is important that firms can choose between the levels of payout. This as-
sumption also eliminated the consideration of different value-relevant payout 
and retention decisions. After relaxing these rules there are now also payout 
policy decisions, which affect the firm value through the present value of free 
cash flows. The payout policy itself matters, since it partly determines partly the 
firm value at the stock market. The managers of the firm can choose suboptimal 
payout policies, when the retention is allowed, therefore DeAngelo et al. (2006) 
state that the payout policy does matter. This is true, because it will establish 
relevance, if there is even one suboptimal policy. 
 
During a firm early years good investment opportunities are usually plenty, 
therefore these companies are in need of equity, which they can raise through 
share issue, also they do not pay dividends. However in the later years the 
firms have less good investment opportunities, and therefore tend to pay divi-
dends and repurchase stock in order to minimize the waste of free cash flow. 
This trade-off theory is based on the idea that free cash flow to shareholders is 
the motivation behind optimal payout policy. This demonstrates the fact that 
payout policy does matter, however firms tend to choose different payout poli-
cies depending on the amount of good investment opportunities that are repre-
sented to them, however some firms also choose to use dividends with the use 
of getting funds through issuing new shares. (DeAngelo et al. 2006: 313 – 314 
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3.3. Different theories of dividend payments 
 
There have been several different types of theories trying to answer the so 
called “dividend puzzle” label given by Black (1976). The theories, which are 
now discussed, are focused on the payment of dividends. Some of these theo-
ries, such as the clientele effect have been under severe criticisms since the 
foundation of this theory. There has been evidence found on either side, some 
which have shown that it has functioned (see Elton et al. 1970; Kalay 1982) and 
others showing that there have been something else going on (see Miller & 
Scholes 1982; Bali & Hite 1998). 
 
Theories that are represented also include agency theory and signaling theory. 
Signaling theory has received lot of attention and has been under research quite 
similar to the clientele theory, since the 70s. Agency theory has received atten-
tion, since the 80s, and it began in the paper done by Easterbrook (1984). Also, 
some other explanations are discussed in the last chapter 3.3.4. These explana-
tions do not have strong empirical back up, but they have been found during 
other studies (see Shefrin & Statman 1984; Long 1978; Allen et al. 2002). 
 
3.3.1. Clientele effect  
 
The clientele effect is based on the idea of differences in taxation. Since taxes 
differ between investors groups, these groups will purchase different types of 
dividend paying stocks. The clientele theory was first created by MM during 
their research (also see Kalay 1982; Booth 1984; Scholz 1992; Allen et al. 2002; 
Perez-Gonzalez 2003). High-income individual will create a group which pre-
fers stocks that pay low dividends, since they are taxed more heavily on divi-
dends than others, which is combined usually with the notion that capital gains 
are cheaper for this group. Second group could be created by individuals with 
low-income who usually have lower taxation of dividends, since they receive so 
little of them and therefore do not prefer capital gains. Usually this group is 
found to have such small investments that it does not seem to care at all about 
capital gains or dividends, which they receive in very small quantities anyways. 
Third group usually mentioned are the institutional investor, who do not have 
to pay taxes at all, and will therefore also like the high payment of dividends. 
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Sometimes institutions are mentioned to want to hold the medium yield stock, 
and corporation wanting to hold the high yield stock, since due to tax reasons 
they should prefer dividend income in the United States (Fama et al. 2001, Allen 
et al. 2002:24). This clientele model was called the “static clientele model” by Al-
len et al. (2002: 21). 
 
Allen et al. (2002) mention that there is a certain case where all investors are 
taxed similarly and dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains. In this 
situation the firms with high yield would certainly be valued lower than firms 
that have low yield. The capital gains should also be preferred over dividends, 
since the tax payer can choose the optimal time, when they prefer to pay the 
actual taxes, in the case of dividends they have to pay them at the time of divi-
dend payment. There has been a clear demonstration by Constantinides (1984) 
that investors will pay for the option to delay capital gains realization and he 
labelled it as “tax timing option”. 
 
The static clientele effect has been researched mostly by using ex-dividend day 
behaviour (see Elton et al. 1970, Kalay 1982, Booth 1984, Perez-Gonzalez 2003). 
This type of research has been criticized however, because other authors ( see 
Miller & Scholes 1978, Miller & Scholes 1982) have showed that there are sev-
eral other factors that may have influenced this type of research. Bali et al. 
(1998: 128-131) researched the discreteness of trading prices and found that the 
tick size of stocks affected the drop in the values of ex-dividend day. They 
showed that the actual drop in ex-dividend day always dropped to the nearest 
tick size, which was closest to the price minus dividend value difference. The 
tick size has less importance when looking at the stock that pays high divi-
dends, since the difference between the tick size effect and the actual effect is 
lower, and vice versa for low yield stocks. However the usual size of the divi-
dends is small and therefore tick size effect plays a major role in the ex-
dividend day prices. They conclude that this effect cannot fully explain the 
price differences, and therefore does not rule out the existence of clientele effect. 
The ex-day prices do have too much noise according to Bali et al. (1998: 156) to 
work as estimators of clientele effect. Similarly Miller et al. (1982: 1138 – 1141) 
exclaim that noise created by short-term trading could have totally obscured the 
data, so that the tax-clientele effect would not be seen. They also argue that 
transaction costs are one of the reasons why the ex-dividend prices do not fully 
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fall by the amount of dividend. Short-term trading can be one of the causes why 
the ex-dividend day results could be flawed. 
 
Scholz (1992: 261 – 265) created a new way of testing the clientele effect, since 
the ex-dividend day research has been under so much criticism. He used proxy 
for the risk preference of the investors. The research was done using data of in-
dividual portfolios from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances. The research 
did show clear indications that the investors formed certain preferential divi-
dend clienteles. He stated that this result may be one of the reasons why man-
agers are so reluctance in changing their dividend policies. Perez-Gonzalez 
(2003) used exogenous variation from personal income tax rates and was able 
show that there was certain clientele effect. The effect was only noticed in cases 
were the large shareholders were affected by the tax changes. He did similar 
study by using ex-dividend prices and found similar results. In cases where 
companies were heavily owned large amount of individual shareholders the 
clientele effect was confirmed. This seems to clearly show that the clientele ef-
fect does not influence all companies in the market, only those that are mostly 
owned by similar investors, which are similarly affected by the tax changes. 
Booth (1984) found no evidence of clientele effect in Canada. He did however 
find evidence of difference between foreign and domestic investors, because the 
listed and interlisted stocks acted different.  
 
Allen, Bernando & Welch (2000) make an assumption that institutions are more 
likely to invest in firms that pay dividends, and argue that clientele effect is the 
foundation of the presence of dividends, since the institutions are more in-
formed about the companies through monitoring or that they are better than 
most in detecting firm quality. These are reasons why the firms paying more 
dividends attract more institutional ownership and perform better. Also, the 
institutions are far better managers than dispersed group of individual inves-
tors, and through management of the firm can influence the value of the firm. 
The managers will not reduce dividend payments, since they do not want to 
anger institutional shareholder. This could also be one of the reasons why oth-
ers are willing to pay shares of these firms, which could strike a flaw in the cli-
entele effect, since if the clienteles would prefer stocks that only perform well 
instead of firms that pay certain amounts of dividends. 
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“Starting with the premise that the stockholder wishes to maximize his after-tax 
wealth we can derive an expression between the ex-dividend behavior of com-
mon stock prices and the marginal tax rates of marginal stockholders (Elton et 
al. 1970: 69).” Now consider a shareholder who wishes to avoid the dividend, 
would receive the price for the stock (PB) less the tax on capital gains for owning 
the stock (tc (PB - PC)). Next we have a shareholder who wishes to capture the 
dividend, which means that he would receive the dividend (D) and would have 
to pay his tax rate on ordinary income (1 – td) plus the after tax income from the 
sale of the share (PA - tC(PA - PC)). Now both of these shareholders would have 
to receive equal amount of wealth in either case. Now also, making the assump-
tions that investors are risk neutral and there are transaction costs. It can be 
show that: 
 
(9) 
  
 
 
PB = stock price cum-dividend (the last day the stock is 
traded with the dividend)  
PA = expected stock price on the ex-dividend day (the first      
day stock is traded without the dividend) 
P0 = stock price at initial purchase 
D = dividend amount 
tc = personal tax rate on capital gains 
td = personal tax rate on dividends 
 
The equations left-hand side can be rearranged to show what happens, if seller 
just wanted to capture the dividend. In order to do so they would have to sell 
the stock cum-dividend and have bought it for P0. The other side show what 
would happen, if the seller would try to avoid dividends due to tax reasons. 
They would have to sell the stock before dividend payment and buy it back 
right after dividends are paid. The classic Elton and Gruber equation: 
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PB =stock price cum-dividend (the last day the stock is 
traded with the dividend)  
PA =expected stock price on the ex-dividend day (the first 
day stock is traded without the dividend) 
tg = personal tax rate on capital gains 
td = personal tax rate on dividends 
In the research the PA is replaced by the actual ex-dividend day stock price. 
(Elton et al. 1970: 69).  
 
3.3.2. Signaling 
 
Main concept behind signaling is that the outsiders and insiders can have dif-
ferent information about the company. This is called asymmetric information. 
This could lead into a situation were the insiders could try to use signaling, if 
the situation was such that the company was undervalued by the markets. In 
such a case the company would increase dividend payment in order to convey 
this message to the outsiders, which is called signaling. Raising the dividends 
would give new information to the markets about the firm’s future prospects. 
The theory also works the other way around, firms that are not doing so well in 
the markets can be forced to cut dividends, which would give a signal that the 
firm is overvalued. This theory has tried to explain why firms pay such large 
amount of dividends each year. Argument as to why firms would choose to pay 
these dividends and stand out to be stronger performs than other is stated in 
quite many papers (see Allen et al. 2002; Bernheim & Wantz 1995; Bernheim 
1991; Ambarish, Kose and Williams 1987; Miller & Rock 1985; Bhattacharya 
1985). The firms are categorised as high-quality and low-quality firms. The ones 
that are high-quality can devote themselves to the higher payment of dividends 
than the firms that are categorised as being low-quality ones. The idea is that 
high-quality firms commit themselves to such high payment of dividends that 
the low-quality firms cannot duplicate it. However the low-quality firms might 
be tempted to try to imitate the high-quality firms in hopes of being valued 
higher by the markets, but this would be a short lived moment since they 
would not be able to keep up the higher payments for long.  
 
The first theories were created in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Some of the 
best know are Bhattacharya (1979), Miller et al. (1985), and Ambarish et al. 
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(1987). The first theories set out to confirm the signaling theory. The first ones 
created did not take taxes into consideration, however in the Ambarish et al. 
(1987) paper these were taken into account. Neither of these papers however 
touched the essence of the problem that Black (1976) stated as the “Dividend 
puzzle”, why do firms pay so much dividends when there are other methods 
that can be used, which are a less costly way of dealing wealth to the share-
holders, or, in this case, signaling.  
 
The first best and well known model was created by Bhattacharya (1979), who 
used a two-period model. The managers were assumed to maximise the share 
value of the firm, also the managers were the only ones to know about future 
incomes that would be determined by the investment decision, which they 
made.  One major component of the model was the thought, that if X describes 
the income and D the amount of dividends the firm has committed to did not 
meet, meaning that D would be greater than X at some point, the firm would 
have to incur the cost of selling some real assets, or postpone investments. The 
paper did not mention the fact, which has been mentioned in many other pa-
pers (see Modigliani et al. 1961; Allen et al. 2002; Bernheim et al. 1995) that the 
firm could take new debt to finance the dividends. The model was such that at 
time zero managers invested into a certain project, and made a decision about 
signaling that the project was good, if they thought so, by committing to a large 
dividend at time 1. At time 1, the firm would receive income from the invest-
ment and pay the dividends that it had committed to. At time 2, the firm would 
be sold to a new group of investors who would receive the second part of the 
income generated by the investment made at time 0. The share price that the 
first shareholders would receive from selling at time 2 would depend on the 
new shareholders beliefs about the profitability of the investment that was 
made at time 0. The major step forward with this model was that the model 
would work even if the dividends were taxed. However, the model failed to 
explain why the firms would use dividends to signal about their future. The 
model had similar feature to many other signaling models, since it treated share 
repurchases and dividends as perfect substitutes for one another. 
 
Other best known models included in the field of signaling are Miller et al. 
(1985) and Ambarish et al. (1987). These were created because of the dissatisfac-
tion to the first models. Miller et al. (1985) created a model which was quite 
similar to the one created by Bhattacharya, however they assumed that some of 
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the shareholder would want to sell their share of the firm at the time 1, which 
would affect the decision making of the managers concerning investment and 
payout decisions. They also mention that a good firm would have to pay such 
amount of dividends that it would be sufficiently high in order to be unattrac-
tive for bad firms to reduce their investment in order to achieve the same level. 
They also propose in the paper that the signaling would not be needed, if the 
inside information would be eliminated by disclosure laws and restriction to 
insider trading. The model however failed to explain the fact that if dividends 
were taxed and repurchase were not, why firms would pay dividends (Allen et 
al. 2002: 55).  
 
The difference between these two models are the dissipative costs, in the Bhat-
tacharya (1979) model the dissipative cost was the transaction cost of having to 
find outside funds in order to pay dividends. In the model done by Miller et al. 
(1985) the dissipative cost were those which distorted the firm’s investment de-
cisions. Both of these models claimed that repurchases and dividends are per-
fect substitutes. 
 
Ambarish et al. (1987) model was different to the two already mentioned, since 
in this model the dividends and repurchases are not treated as substitutes. Simi-
larly to Miller et al. (1985) the model started through the assumption that 
shareholder have liquidity needs, which they will satisfy through selling some 
of their shares. They mention that the dilution that the stockholders suffer 
through the issuing of new shares or through selling their own stocks, which 
leads the managers to increase the value of the firm, so that the dilution effect is 
less for the original shareholder. The most important innovation in this study 
was that the dividends are used as a signaling device, because of the taxes that 
shareholder have to incur when they receive dividends. The bad companies will 
have to be willing to bear the cost of the taxes when using dividends, which 
will make them even more undesirable than mere repurchase. 
 
The main strength of these signaling models is that they are able to explain the 
positive market reaction to dividend increases and to announcement of share 
repurchases. Idea behind this is that the dividend payments inform market 
about the firm’s future prospects. These models are still criticised by Allen et al. 
(2002: 54) since they fail to explain why firms smooth dividends. There is also 
no explanation about why the management would care so much about the next 
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period stock price. This is also linked to their other criticism about the man-
agement’s willingness to waste money on signaling about their true value 
through dividends, especially when the true value will be revealed to all in the 
next period.  The final question that they pose is that why would firms use re-
purchases or dividends to signal. 
 
One of the most interesting signaling modelling that takes into consideration 
different tax regimes is the paper done by Bernheim et al. (1995). Even before 
this paper Bernheim (1991), studied the taxation of dividend alone. The most 
interesting finding in the paper was that neither dividend tax rate nor repur-
chase tax rate have an effect on net distribution nor to government revenue. 
Also, the paper is worthwhile noticing, since it talks about an optimal tax rate, 
which could be achieved by the firms through the usage of repurchases, new 
equity issues, and dividends appropriately. The optimal tax rate would allow 
the firms to signal at minimum tax cost. Bernheim et al. (1995) empirically test 
the signaling through the usage of “bang-for-the-buck”, which is quite similar 
to the one used to test the dividend tax changes. The “bang-for-the-buck” de-
scribes the relationship between the paid dividend and share price change; 
therefore it describes how well the market values the dividend payment. Their 
findings indicate that the bang-for-the-buck increases with dividend tax rate, 
and they go on saying that this finding is favourable to the signaling hypothe-
sis. They also note similarly to Allen et al. (2002: 51 – 57) that most of the mod-
els done in the past are not dynamic, however they go on to argue that even 
though their model is not dynamic they should capture the actual change. Allen 
and Michaely (2002) thought that this was the major short coming of all of the 
research done in this field.  
 
There is also another explanation to why firms use dividends as a means of sig-
naling, they might be conveying information about changes in risks. This has 
been reasoned through the fundamental about news concerning firms, since 
they must either concern the cash flows or the discount rates. Therefore the sig-
nal might have been misinterpreted and the firms signaling about the future 
cash flows, while the real explanation could have been that they are signaling 
about decline in systematic risk instead. (Allen et al.: 2002; Grullon, Michaely & 
Swaminathan: 2002) 
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Maturity hypothesis has also been developed. Basic idea behind this hypothesis is 
the fact that after firms becomes more mature, their investment opportunities 
tend to decline, and therefore they are more willing to increase their cash pay-
out. These firms also should have declining profitability and risk. This model is 
however explains that this maturity would start slowly and therefore the in-
creased dividend payments might be one of the signs of this process. The model 
also explain why young firms prefer not to pay dividends, since these firms 
have large amount of positive NPV project available, and they make large eco-
nomic profits, and most importantly have low amount of free cash flow com-
pared to the more mature firms with less investment opportunities. (Grullon, et 
al. 2002: 388, 421 – 422.) 
 
The signaling theories can be seen in two different ways: in the first one the 
dividends are used to signal future cash flows such as in Bhattacharya (1979), in 
the second one they provide information about earnings, which has been dem-
onstrated in the model by Miller & Rock (1985). The second alternative can be 
understood, so that even if the dividends do convey information, it would not 
necessarily mean that dividends would be used to signal. Also, it is clear from 
the research that the lowering dividends carried more information content than 
increasing dividends. There was also clearly a post-dividend announcement 
drift, which informs that if the firms use dividends as a signaling device the 
market does not get the signal. This creates a problem to the signaling hypothe-
sis, since why would firms use dividends to signal. If it is only a costly way of 
doing so and the market does not receive their message. Even more disturb-
ingly Benartzi, Michaely and Thales (1997) found a clear pattern of earnings 
increase two years after a dividend cut. Continuing this line of findings Grullon 
et al. (2002) confirmed these findings, and went on to show that the level of 
firms’ profitability tended to decrease in the year following the announcement 
of dividend increase. (Allen et al. 2002: 65 – 70) 
 
3.3.3. Agency 
 
One of the first papers to research this issue was in the paper done by Easter-
brook (1984: 652 – 655). He sough an explanation for dividend payments from 
the agency theory. Although he went on saying that even though he based his 
theory on dividends, that it could as well be done with repurchases. Easter-
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brook gave two different explanations for the agency theory. First, explanation 
was that the agency cost is the cost of monitoring the managers. Shareholders 
would be better of if there was certain person monitoring the managers on their 
behalf. Second, explanation of the agency cost raises from the risk aversion of 
the managers. The managers do not act in the best interest of the shareholders, 
if they are risk averse, since the shareholders would want them to prefer risk. 
This rises from the fact that the managers have personal wealth tied up in their 
firms and therefore might tend to be risk averse since they are acting in their 
own interest. Both of these problems could be less serious, if the firm had to be 
constantly in the market for new capital. The capital markets create a monitor-
ing, and also incentives for the managers to cut agency costs. When issuing new 
shares the firms will have to be reviewed by different intermediaries, also they 
will be under the scrutiny of new shareholders, which are seen as better than 
old ones at decreasing agency costs. Similar effects are also seen when a firm 
acquires more debt finance. The dividends are seen as a way to compel the 
firms to enter the capital markets more often, also it is noted that even thought 
firms would not have to enter capital markets they will at least increase the 
debt-equity ratio, and therefore the shareholders are not giving too much 
wealth away to the bondholders. 
 
Treatment of minority shareholders has also been seen to lead to agency costs, 
which has also been called the legal protection of shareholders. Explanation of 
this is based on the fact that there might be certain owners that control major 
portion of the firm, who might be employees of the firm and therefore be less 
willing to use dividends as payout. These big shareholders therefore might be 
using their control over the firm in pursuit of their own benefits. This theory 
has lead to two alternative models called the outcome of legal protection of 
shareholders and substitute of legal protection of shareholders. In the first the-
ory the minority shareholders use legal protection to assure that the firms have 
to pay dividends, and thereby prevent the insiders from using too much of the 
companies earnings only to benefit themselves. Under the second model, the 
corporation are following similar payout as in the first one in order to establish 
good reputation. This reputation is needed so that the company may raise ex-
ternal funds on better terms. This requires that the company follows these divi-
dend payments, meaning that it will not lower the payments in the future. Find-
ings of the study suggested that the poorly protected shareholders seem to ac-
cept whatever dividends the firms pay, which they assumed to be part of the 
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agency cost of poor legal protection. On the other hand in countries which had 
better protection of minority shareholders the dividend payments were higher, 
also it was noted that fast growing firms had lower dividend payments com-
pared those with slow growth. This was consistent with the idea that the own-
ers with better legal protection are willing to wait for their dividends, when 
companies have plenty of good investment opportunities. Countries that had 
better legal protection were found to be common-law countries, and vice versa 
in the civil-law countries. In countries with better legal protection the share-
holders force the firms to pay dividends. Quality of legal protection for share-
holders is important factor that has an affection firms’ payout policy, since 
those countries, which had better legal protection had companies that had 
higher payouts than in countries with less legal protection for shareholders. (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny 2000: 2 – 5, 27) 
 
A Finnish study done by Maury and Pajuste (2002: 16 – 18, 33 – 37) proposed 
that the agency problems might not be with the corporate managers and share-
holders, instead they suggested that it might be between the controlling share-
holders and minority shareholders. They found a negative relationship between 
concentration of control and dividend-to-earning ratio. Not only did the largest 
shareholder’s voting power, but the combined group of largest and second 
largest shareholder’s tended to collude to create private benefits. This might 
also be true since these firms indicated to have low payout levels. Dividends 
payments were found to be less when CEO was among the three largest share-
holders. There was no evidence that the separating the ownership and control 
would explain the difference between the amounts of dividend payments. This 
was explained by trade-off between the tax advantages of dividends and pri-
vate benefits, which the private shareholders had to face, because of Finnish 
imputation tax system, which was altered in 2004.  
 
3.3.4. Other explanations   
 
One motive for firms to pay dividends has been based on the effect of transac-
tion costs. This motive has been argued to arise from the shareholders need for 
steady flow of income from their capital investments. And since transaction 
costs affect the selling and buying of stocks from the markets, these have been 
theories that the dividends payments could be the cheapest way for the share-
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holders to full fill their needs.  These costs have fallen after the switch to negoti-
ated commissions in may 1975. Even though the costs have fallen demand for 
dividends has not been altered. The argument has been mostly linked to small 
investors, which hold low amount of shares, but their role in the market place 
has been declining. (Allen et al. 2002: 84) 
 
There was also a suggestion that the investor behaviour could explain the need 
for dividends.  This behaviour was such that the capital investment made could 
be under a rule of do not use these funds, however the dividends were viewed 
as something that could be spent. Because of this inhibition the shareholders 
would not sell stocks to receive similar amount of money that the dividend 
payments would make. This meant that the dividends and capital would not be 
perfect substitutes. Dividend taxation does not matter since the shareholders 
are willing to pay the high taxes because of the self-control reasons. This theory 
can explain why individual investors act certain way, however it does not ex-
plain why firms pay so much dividends. (Shefrin & Statman 1984: 256 – 257) 
 
Case of the Citizens Utilities (CU) Company gives as a peculiar view of how the 
market treats different types of dividend payments. CU is a unique case, since 
during the 1955 until 1975 the company had two different types of common 
stocks, which were only different through dividend payments. First ones the 
series A stocks paid stock dividends, while the series B stocks paid cash divi-
dends. Price ratio of A and B stocks should have been 1.1, since the stock divi-
dends averaged at 10% higher than the cash dividends, however this ratio was 
found to be consistently below 1.1 during the study period. Markets seem to 
favour cash dividends that were offered by the series B, even though most of 
the investors would have paid less taxes, if they had owned the series A. (Long 
1978: 235 – 243, 262 – 263) 
 
3.4. Different studies of taxation and ex-dividend day ratios 
 
One of the best known studies in the field of dividend taxation and clientele 
effect is Elton et al. (1970). Their paper started the study on how the taxation of 
dividends effected the valuation of dividends. They stated that since dividends 
are taxed, there should be a way of deriving the marginal stockholder’s tax 
bracket through them. This would provide important information concerning 
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the dividend policy, if the tax bracket could be known. The main idea behind 
their theory was that in a rational market the prices would reflect the marginal 
stockholders brackets, because the value of a dividend versus capital gains 
would show in the prices of shares. This requires however that the capital gains 
and dividends are taxed differently, which is usually the case. Therefore, in 
markets where there are different tax rates on capital gains and dividends, these 
different types of tax rates will affect the shareholders decisions. 
 
Table 1. Tax reform act of 1986 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many researchers have used the formulas created by Elton et al. (1970), since 
they have been the basis of the ex-day studies that have been conducted (see 
Booth & Johnston 1984; Hietala 1990; Lamdin & Hiemstra 1993; Liljeblom et al. 
2001). Some have also used other methods, which have usually had different 
ratios that were used in regression analysis (see Bolster & Janjigian 1991; Blou-
ing et al. 2004; Varo 2006) Next different researches will be discussed. These 
were done in six different countries, which included United States, Canada, 
Germany, Hong Kong, United Kingdom’s, Taiwan, and Finland. Most of these 
have studied the effects of tax change. 
 
3.3.1. United States 
 
The tax reform act of 1986 lowered the top capital tax rate from 46 per cent to 34 
for corporations. There was also a reduction in the of intercorporate dividend 
exclusion from 85 percent before 1987 to 80 after 1986 and even more after 1988 
when 70 percent exclusion took place. In addition, personal income tax rates 
were lowered substantially. There was a 60 percent exclusion on long term capi-
tal gains, which was eliminated in the tax reform act. Short-term capital gains 
and dividends were unaffected; also, institutional taxation of capital gains and 
dividends was left untouched.  These figures lead us to actual change from 6.9 
percent ( 0.46 * 0.15 ) to 6.8 percent ( 0.34 * 0.20 ) to 10.2% ( 0.34 * 0.30), which 
-1985 1986 1988
Top capital tax rate 46,00 % 34,00 % 34,00 %
Dividend exclusion of intercorporate 85,00 % 80,00 % 70,00 %
Top marginal tax rate 50,00 % 20,00 % 20,00 %
Tax rate change 6,90 % 6,80 % 10,20 %
Actual change in taxation -1,45 % 50,00 %
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clearly shows that the taxation of dividends tightened after 1988. (Lamdin & 
Hiemstra 1993: 779) 
 
In their research, Bolster et al. (1991) examined the influence of the tax reform 
act of 1986 on shareholder wealth and dividend policy. For the latter research 
problem they used a sample of firms from the period 1984 through 1989. The 
researchers examined aggregate dividend payments and overall payout ratios, 
which were defined as Total Dividends/Total After Tax Earnings for each of the 
years. The payments were on a steady rise throughout the whole observation 
period. This meant that the dividend policy of firms was not directly, if at all in 
close connection with the tax reform act of 1986.  A mean aggregate payout ra-
tio for the entire sample of firms for each year was derived by dividing the 
mean annual dividend payment by the mean annual after-tax earnings. There 
was no clear trend observed from one year to the next and the ratios were al-
most identical pre- and post-reform. In conclusion there was no evidence that 
dividend policy had been altered because of tax reform. 
 
Table 2. Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 
 
The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 reduced the personal 
tax rate on dividends to 15 percent (38.1 percent).  This tax relief is temporary it 
expires in 2009. The tax relief has no effect to persons who, have relatively high 
levels of income (between $100,000-500,000), and therefore follow the alterna-
tive minimum tax (AMT). Due to AMT they pay 28 percent tax on dividends. 
Due to this low tax of 28 percent, compared to the 38 percent, the persons hav-
ing AMT receive only 13 percent instead of 23 percent drop in their dividend 
taxation. Blouin et al. (2004) assume that change in dividend taxation due to its 
temporary nature will dramatically raise the dividends. This assumption is 
based on the fact that it will end in 2009 and during this short period investors 
can extract dividends from corporations at a low tax cost.  (Blouin et al. 2004.) 
 
Chetty et al. (2004) have found out that certain firms paying regular and special 
dividends rose after enactment of the tax relief. This information was also con-
firmed by Blouin et al. (2004). The firms that increased their dividend payments 
-2002 2003 2009
Personal tax rate on dividends 38,10 % 15,00 % 38,10 %
Taxation of persons with AMT 28,00 % 15,00 % 28,00 %
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were owned heavily by managers and other key insiders. The mere large num-
ber of individual investors did not lead to alter dividend policy. The figures 
might be faulty, because the economy also grew during the period, which could 
have influenced the dividend payments. (Blouin et al. 2004.) 
   
3.3.2. Canada 
 
Canadian tax changes took place between the years 1970 and 1980. There were 
four distinct periods, which each had own taxation. These periods can be di-
vided as follows: 1970 - 1971, 1972 - 1976, 1977, and 1978 - 1980. Actual tax 
changes that were made were only two, but the second tax reform had a interim 
year during 1977. During the first period tax credit was a 20 percent of dividend 
income. After the 1972 tax reform dividends tax credit was left untouched, but 
one third of dividend income was liable to taxation. During 1978 a minor revi-
sion was made, 50 percent of the dividend income became taxable and the tax 
credit was increased to 25 percent. During 1977 there was a interim year and 
only the tax credit was lowered from 20 percent to 18.75 percent. Capital gains 
taxation was introduced in Canada during 1972 after that all short and long 
term capital gain became taxable with 50 percent of the individuals ordinary tax 
rate. These changes are shown in the Table 3. Major part of companies and insti-
tutions have no taxation of dividends. There are also two savings plans made 
for individuals, which make low amount of investments tax free. These two 
plans are made for retirement plans and for individuals who do not own a 
house but want to save for one. It was noted that these two plans have raised 
the amount of individual stock owners. (Booth et al. 1984: 457.) 
 
Table 3. Canadian tax changes 
 
Capital taxation of marginal stockowner is low, which is demonstrated by the 
study of the ex-day drop ratios. The drop off ratios did not confirm the exis-
tence of tax clienteles. There was a doubt that the effect might be hidden, be-
cause of the short-term trading that was taking place by wealthy and sophisti-
cated investors. Canadian stocks can be divided into two distinct groups based 
1970 - 1972 1972 - 1976 1977
Tax credit of dividends 20,00 % 20,00 % 18.75%
Taxable % of dividends 0,00 % 33.33 % 33.33%
Capital gains tax 0,00 %    50% of individuals ordinary tax rate
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on where they are traded, since there are stocks that are only traded domesti-
cally and those that are traded in Canada and the United states. There was clear 
difference between these two stocks, and this was thought to be caused by the 
foreign trading taking place on the other market. (Booth et al. 1984: 475 – 476) 
 
3.3.3. Hong Kong 
 
There have been strong doubts about the results of the ex-day studies. One of 
these has been cast by the study done by Frank and Jagannathan (1998: 161–
162,185–186). They examined the Hong Kong stock markets, which were pecu-
liar, since there are no taxes for neither capital nor dividend income. These do 
however have something that hinders the markets, since there was strong 
amount of regulations and restrictions, which make short-term trading very 
hard, especially with the high transaction costs. The study clearly showed that 
the tax hypothesis does not work in these markets, since the ex-day ratios are 
below one. The actual ex-day ratios were close to 0.8, which is clearly below the 
number given by tax hypotheses. Other micro structure effect caused by tick 
size was ruled out by Frank et al. (1998) through several different tests. These 
left little doubt that the tick size affect might be sole cause for ex-dividend day 
ratios. 
 
3.3.4. Australia 
 
Brown and Clarke (1993) studied the effects of different tax changes in the Aus-
tralian markets. Changes took place during the time between 1984 and 1988.  
First, there was an introduction of capital gains tax, which took place on 1985, 
after the 19 of September that same year all old and new assets were affected by 
the change. Second, reform took place shortly after during 1987, when dividend 
imputation system was introduced. Third, the superannuation funds that re-
ceived dividends from Australian public companies became entitled to rebate. 
This change was made to facilitate the introduction of income tax on superan-
nuation funds. 
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Table 4. Australian tax changes (Brown & Clarke 1993: 1 – 5) 
 
 
 
 
 
Research was done by using the drop-off ratios of different time periods. Re-
sults amazed Brown and Clarke (1993: 36 – 35), since on other hand it seemed 
that there was tax affect, while at the same time it seemed that there was none. 
After the introduction of the capital gains tax the markets reacted opposite to 
the tax hypothesis, and during introduction of imputation system the market 
reacted according to the tax hypothesis. One of the reasoning behind this was 
that the Australians did not fully access the value of the tax credit during the 
first years. It seems that it took time for the investors to actually gain full benefit 
from it, since during 1990 they only received 80 percent. The evidence did sug-
gest that there is clientele effect across dividend yields. There was weak evi-
dence of short-term trading during 1989, which was believed to be caused by 
fixed brokers’ commissions before 1984.  
 
3.3.5. Taiwan 
 
Repurchases became legal in Taiwan during 2000. Capital gains tax in Taiwan is 
zero. Due to this capital gains tax the highly taxed individuals tend to hold 
firms, which pay low or zero dividends and trade out of firms that increase 
dividends payments. Opposite is true for individual and institutions with low 
taxes. Lee, Liu, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2005) found out that firms with high 
concentration of highly taxed shareholders were more likely to start repurchase 
programs. Also vast number of firms that had been paying dividends ceased 
paying them entirely, and started repurchase programs. (Lee et al. 2005.) 
   
3.3.6. United Kingdoms 
 
First tax change took place during 1988. Change in the law eliminated income 
taxes, which were above 40 percent, and taxation of capital gains for private 
individual’s with highest level of income tax rate. This was equivalent to the 
Tax Changes
1985 Introduction of capital gains tax
1987 Introduction of dividend imputations
1988 Superannuity fund
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1986 Tax Reform Act of the United States. Lasfer (1995) hypothesized that this 
would lead to a decline in the ex-day tax premium after the tax change, and 
there would be negative affect on tax credit received from the cash dividends. 
He found no indications of short-term trading during the study period between 
the years 1985 and 1994. This might be explained by the high amount of trans-
action costs compared to the tax credits included with dividends. Biggest affect 
was noted on the highest dividend yield companies, and no change in the low-
est dividend yield companies. The ex-day share prices of lowest dividend yield 
companies were reduced by the full amount of dividend in both periods.  
 
Second tax change took place during July 1997. The actual change eliminated 
the tax credit for institutions. Under the old system institutions received total of 
125 percent value of the dividend, since they could get a refund from the tax 
credit, which the corporation had to pay for the dividends. Under the new sys-
tem dividends declined to 100 percent, which means that institutions will re-
ceive 20 percent less dividends compared to the old system.  
 
Table 5. United Kingdom’s tax change of 1997(Bell et al.  2002: 1322 −  1330) 
 
 
The hypothesis by Bell et al. (2002) was that the institutions were the marginal 
investors. Because they were tax-exempt investors, the change would alter their 
preference from dividend income to capital gains. After the tax change the insti-
tution valuation of dividend income was found to be less, also institutions were 
more interested in the low-yielding companies. Research was done by using 
DOR-ratios (price drop to dividend), which are normally used in ex-dividend 
day studies. The DOR-ratios showed that the larger companies lowered divi-
dend payments, and they found that the institution were marginal owners of 
these larger companies. The researchers drew a conclusion that the change in 
the taxation had affected the dividend payments. 
 
Before 1997 tax change After April 1999
Pension funds 1,25 1
Higher rate individuals 0,75 0,75
Basic and lower-rate individuals 1 1
Corporations 1 1
Charities 1,25 1,21
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3.3.7. Germany 
 
Amihud and Murgia (1997) have compared the dividend payments between 
Germany and United states between 1988 and 1992, have found that even 
though Germany has more favourable taxation on dividend income the compa-
nies still choose to pay less than in the United States. They reason that the 
agency costs in Germany are greater, since banks that lend to these companies 
have major control in the shareholder’s meetings and therefore prefer that the 
companies pay low dividends. Secondly the cost of issuing equity to replace the 
dividend payments is high.  
 
3.5. Earlier research of taxation in Finland 
 
Kasanen and Niskanen (1992) studied the effect of the 1969 Finnish tax reform. 
Their study was concentrated on the effect of reform to different industries. 
This question rouse from the study conducted by Lindström (1987), which had 
caused him to claim that the dividend policy of the Finnish firms had been sta-
bile. Therefore the Kasanen et al. (1992) study tried to find out if this stability 
had changed after the tax reform, also they wanted to know if there were differ-
ences between different types of industries. 
 
The sample firms were selected on the basis of information availability, since all 
of the companies did not have information during the whole study period. 
Banks and insurance companies were left out, because of their stronger regula-
tions; also, there was no data readily available. Only industrial, transportation 
and commercial firms were selected. The study was performed on 33 firms, 
which accounted for 86.0 % of the market value of the industrial and commer-
cial firms in 1982. Stock market data was not available for all the firms during 
the period therefore they used current earnings as a proxy for company per-
formance. (Kasanen et al. 1992: 12 – 13.) 
 
Kasanen et al. (1992) thought that one of the major reasons behind the passive 
dividend policies were the traditionally dominant role of institutional owner-
ship. Finnish stock markets are thinly traded and therefore the cash dividends 
are important to the institutions, which would have hard time getting cash 
flows through selling large amounts of stocks on these thinly traded markets. 
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The findings suggested that current earnings were statistically significant ex-
planatory variable when looking at the whole sample; however when they ran 
regression for the two sub periods before and after the tax reform the results 
were not significant. Also, the fact that the trend-autoregressive dividend 
model performed as well as the primary dividend adjustment model, suggested 
that the current earnings might not be so important. This result supports the 
hypothesis of stable dividend behaviour were current earnings do not play a 
major role. Lagged dividends were found to have more importance determin-
ing the current dividend payments than the current earnings. (Kasanen et al 
1992: 7, 24.) 
 
Results of this study confirmed the Lindström (1987) statement of stable divi-
dends. Main reason for this could be the dominant role of institutions’ demand 
for dividends. The average share ownership of institutions was 63.8% during 
1985. Tax reform had an effect on the dividend policies; however it was differ-
ent among industries. Strongest effect was found among the paper industry, 
which is the core sector of Finnish economy. Dividend taxation was lowered 
and the firms started to pay more dividends. As the amount of dividend pay-
ments raised the growth rate of dividend payments went downwards. (Kasanen 
et al. 1992: 23 – 25.) 
 
3.6. Ex-Dividend day research 
 
First to conduct an empirical study using ex-dividend day were Elton and Gru-
ber (1970), since then many have followed the same path. There have been 
modifications that have been made to enhance the equation, which Elton and 
Gruber used (see equation 10).  Bell and Jenkinson (2002) state that the use of 
average ex-day drop-off ratios appeals at first, but after closer examination 
there are several reasons that discourage its use. The empirical distributions of 
the ratios are not normally distributed. And the error term Єi* is heteroskedas-
tic, meaning the drop-off ratios vary strongly among different firms. Vermaelen 
(1983) and Michaely (1991) state that this might have strong influence on the 
price change of small dividends relative to large dividends. 
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Formulas that are used in the ex-day study vary. There is a trend to use market 
adjustment either throughout using average market return (Rm), or market re-
turn with volatility (σi). These have been used by various authors (see Lamdin 
& Hiemstra 1993; Sorjonen 2000; Liljeblom, Löflund, Hedvall 2001; Bell & Jen-
kinson 2002). The use of market adjustment is said to correct the heteroskedastic 
that has been found to be problematic, when conducting tax research. Lamdin 
and Hiemstra (1993) used the following equations: 
 
 
(11)  
  
 
(12) 
 
 
Sorjonen (2002) started by thoroughly examining different types of formulas 
that can be used. All of the formulas he used include the variance term, since 
Michaely (1991) explained that the GLS estimator would help in correcting the 
errors, which the heteroskedasticity has produced in the ex-day studies. First 
formula, which Sorjonen (2000) started with was the following: 
 
(13)   
 
 
This formula (13) was rearranged into the following: 
 
(14) 
 
 
Modifications to the formula were made, because the GLS estimator of α was 
used for the weights of the individual ex-ratios wi=di/σi. This was done to make 
the residual term homoskedastic, since the heteroskedasticy had caused prob-
lems with earlier research as indicated by Vermaely (1983) and Michaely (1991).  
Formula (15) was the actual formula used in his research: 
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In order to correct the formula Sorjonen (2000: 81) used one that had no adjust-
ment for the normal return. He continued the research with the following for-
mula: 
 
(16) 
 
Sorjonen (2000) wrote that there were some problems using return adjustment. 
He explained that there was either no need for the adjustment or that the return 
adjustment was wrong. Therefore he ended up with the formula (16), where the 
term β2(ri/σi) was removed.   
 
Bell et al. (2002: 1335 – 1337) researched the drop-off ratios. They used two dif-
ferent formulas. First one did not include intercept, and the second included it. 
They reasoned that in order to avoid the problems that Elton et al. (1970) first 
equation had they would use formula that gives less weight to lower yielding 
stock with higher ex-day price variability. They start with the following for-
mula.  
 
(17) 
 
Equation (17) is the classic work of Elton and Gruber (1970). Statistic can be es-
timated as the intercept of the regression. The Єi* represents the error term with 
an assumed mean of zero. The equation however presented problems as stated 
by Michaely (1991) and Sorjonen (2000). The following equation presents how 
Elton and Gruber (1970) did their analysis: 
 
(18) 
 
Bell et al. (2002) continue by assuming that the ex-dividend day returns Re can 
be described by the following equation: 
 
(19) 
 
The error term Єi is defined as E(Єi) = 0 and variance of the term is Var(Єi) = (б2). 
There is a problem with using this equation in the ordinary least squares, since 
the residual variance is decreasing in the dividend yield. Therefore they correct 
it with creating the following equation: 
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(20) 
 
The correction is done so that the drop-off ratio will give less weight to lower 
yielding stocks, which have higher ex-day price variability. Also, the drop-off 
ratio is modified to represent the slope coefficient in the OLS regression model 
(DOR = β). This equation, however has an intercept of 0. Bell et al. (2002) 
wanted to relax this condition, because Frank et al. (1998) had developed micro-
structure models describing the ex-day trading behaviour and these had lead to 
imply that there were negative intercept in regressions in the equation (20), 
therefore by adding α they also used the following: 
 
(21) 
 
(22) 
 
 
 
Equations (20) and (23) were used in their research. In the actual research they 
calculated ex-day differences by using the market adjusted values and unad-
justed values. A dummy technique was used to find out the affect between the 
two different periods as shown in equation (22). The variables PreTax2004 and 
PostTax2004 were used as interactive dummies 0 and 1 were used depending on 
the period for which each observation belonged to. The market adjustment was 
done through the following equation: 
 
(23) 
 
This adjustment is quite similar to the one used by Lamdin et al. (1993) in equa-
tions (11) and (12). Only difference is that the equation (23) also uses the β-
coefficient, which describes the risk. 
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3.7. Problems with research 
 
Many have argued against it stating that either short-term selling or market mi-
crostructure may cause the affect that has been called tax affect (see Kalay 1982; 
Lakonishok et al. 1983; Michaely 1991; Brown et al. 1993; Bali et al. 1993; Boyd et 
al. 1994).  With looking at the several different markets it seems that the taxa-
tion and its affect seem to vary strongly in the different markets. The actual 
transaction prices and other regulations may affect it as well as the individual 
investor’s action. Mention that event clustering might have caused some prob-
lems researching the affect, since several firms seem to be paying dividends 
during the same days, which may have affected their prices so that the actual 
affect is not what it should have been (Bell et al. 2002: 1338). Heteroskedastic of 
the data has been one of the big problems early on, but it was solved first by 
Michaely (1991). 
 
Boyd et al. (1994) and Frank et al. (1998) studied the tick size affect on ex-day 
ratios. In the Frank et al. (1998) case the study was conducted in markets that 
had no taxes. Only small price drops were observed. They thought that this was 
caused by the fact that most trades are made at bid prices on last cum day and 
at ask during the ex-dividend day. The models used in these two studies as-
sumed that dividends fall between ticks or at tick multiples; however the ex-
pected price will only drop one tick less than without the regulation. There 
were few stocks in Bali and Hite (1998) study which actually dropped by only 
one tick, which indicates that the regulation infers with the ex-day study. In 
another study by Liljeblom et al. (2001), they point out that this tick size effect 
does not have huge impact on the Finnish market. They do state that tick size 
might effect, however they go on saying that it would only have a small influ-
ence on the ex-day study. Tick sizes at Finnish markets were rather small com-
pared to dividends. 
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4. FINNISH DIVIDEND TAXATION  
 
Dividends are seen as payout for firms. According to Finnish legislation this is 
one of the correct ways of sharing the profits of the company to the sharehold-
ers. Repurchases are also mentioned. The main principle is that the companies 
cannot distribute other wealth, besides the free capital before discharging the 
company. This is done to protect the interests of the creditors. Companies may 
also use other wealth besides cash when they are performing payouts, such 
other forms may include stocks of other companies and bonds, when these can-
not create discrimination between stockowners or lead to division in which cer-
tain stockowners have greater benefits. (Kyläkallio, Iirola & Kyläkallio 2002: 879 
– 880).  
 
The following chapters will describe the two different tax changes that have 
happened in Finland. First chapter 4.1 explains the prior changes in Finnish 
taxation of dividends during 1987 until 1993. The chapters 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 de-
scribe the decision making of dividend payments in Finnish firms. Purpose of 
this chapter is to explain the laws around dividend payments. Finnish law re-
quires that certain procedures need to be followed, and there are some restric-
tions. Minority shareholders can claim their own dividend based on certain 
rules. Last chapter 4.5 describes the 2005 tax reform.  
 
4.1. Taxation in Finland 
 
There have been two major tax changes in the Finnish dividend taxation during 
1987 until 2005. First of these changes was made gradually through several 
years by different changes of the law. These changes include the: in 1987 in-
creasing the amount of tax bases and also lower tax rates, after 1990 adoption of 
an avoir fisca system for the corporate income taxation, changes in the interest 
taxation during 1991, and the last one was made in 1993 when the earned and 
capital incomes were separated and corporate income taxation was changed. 
Before the 90’s tax change the corporate taxation was 25 percent and dividend 
taxation 13 percent. After the change corporate taxation rose to 28 percent and 
the dividend taxation of Finnish stockholders, with Finnish stocks was dimin-
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ished to zero, these investors had to pay taxes on dividends received from 
abroad. (Valkonen 1999: 46 – 47.) 
 
Table 6. Finnish tax changes during 1987 to 2005 (Juusela 2004: 21; Ahonen-
Rautio, Päivi, Kirsti Auranen, Ari Blomqvist, Tommi Etholén, Elina 
Helikoski, Markku Järvenoja,  Hannele Liede, Annu Nikkanen, Tarja 
Kettunen, Anne Klemola, Eija Kuivisto, Ilkka Ojala, Petri Pulkkanen, Timo 
Sneck, Eija Tannisto, Minna Tanska, Susanna Uusitalo, Heikki Vuopala, 
Leena Äärilä  2004: 14; Valkonen 1999: 47) 
 
Starting from the year 1993 Finnish tax legislation was changed into differenti-
ated income tax system and income from dividends was seen as a capital gains. 
Before this change companies did not pay considerable amounts of dividends. 
There was no sense in paying dividends, since the dividends were taxed as or-
dinary income, and also the Finnish tax system had double taxation of distrib-
uted profits. Finnish taxation of capital gains was 25 percent until 1996 and 
from 1996 on it was 28 percent and after 2000 it was changed again to 29 per-
cent, also dividends are seen as capital income (Juusela 2004: 9).There were cer-
tain incentives for some small companies, which were operated by small group 
of peoples; however these were not sufficient enough for even these companies 
to consider paying dividends instead of ordinary wages. After the change in 
taxation during 1993 dividends became more convenient, since instead of pay-
ing wages and certain other payments which are included for companies pay-
ing wages, these other expenses could be saved through paying dividends. 
Dividends were also taxed at a lower rate than wages. (Järvenoja 1997: 2 – 3.) 
 
Basic idea behind the Finnish avoir fiscal policy was that the taxation distrib-
uted profits of incorporations and shareholders is integrated. The shareholder 
will pay taxes according to his own taxation; this requires that the double taxa-
tion of dividends is removed. Therefore taxes which the company has already 
paid are subtracted from the taxes that the shareholder has to pay on his divi-
dends, thereby removing the double taxation. From the example below it is 
easy to see that the individuals with higher taxation have to pay more taxes, 
and individuals with lower taxation are paid a refund from the tax office. (Im-
-1987 1987-1996 1996-2000 2000-2005 2005-
Individual taxation of
Capital gains 0 % 25 % 28 % 29 % 28 %
Individual taxation of
Dividends 13 % 13 % 0 % 29 % 28 %
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monen, Leppiniemi, Niskakangas, Pallonen, Päivärinta, Tikka 1990: 29 – 30.) 
Example: 
 
Let’s assume that there is a company called A, and its shareholder 
B and C. The shareholder receives 5000 Euros of dividends (Euros 
will be used even though marks were used still during 1997). As-
suming that the taxation of B was 28% and C was 50%. 
 
 Dividends received by B  5.000 
 +(avoir fiscal based on dividends 7/18) 1.944,5 
 Taxable income of B   6.944,5 
 Tax rate 28%   1.944,5 
-avoir fiscal    1.944,5 
 Amount of taxes B has to pay         0 
 
 Dividends received by C  5.000 
 +(avoir fiscal based on dividends 7/18) 1.944,5 
 Taxable income of C   6.944,5 
 Tax rate 50%   3.472,32 
-avoir fiscal    1.944,5 
 Amount of taxes C has to pay  1.527,82 
 (Järvenoja 1997: 26 – 27.) 
 
4.2. Decision making process 
 
According to OYL 12:41 § General Meeting always decides upon the distribu-
tion of profits. Time of the payment may be left to board of directors, if there is 
no order on the timing of the payment it must be paid immediately after the 
General Meeting. Dividend payments can consist of the profits from either one 
or several fiscal year.  General meeting cannot decide to payout more than the 
board of directors has proposed or accepted, however this will be accepted if 
the larger amount is based on the minority shareholders claim to minimum 
payment dividends or the company is required by the certificate of incorpora-
tion to pay more dividends than the board of directors has approved or pro-
posed. (Kyläkallio Iirola & Kyläkallio 2002: 890). General Meeting can however 
pay any amount of dividends that it wants, if they change the board of direc-
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tors, also there is a need to stay with in the limits which minority shareholders 
could have demanded, if minority shareholders have made no demand they 
can choose any allowed amount. Companies may choose to pay dividends 
more than once a year, since there is nothing in the OYL that deny such pay-
ments. (Järvenoja 1997:18 – 19, 36.)  
 
There are some limitations to the General Meetings power to pay dividends, 
which are: 
 
1) Permission from the trade registers is required in certain cases when the 
company has lowered its share capital require. The permission in these 
cases is required for the period of next three years, after the lowering of 
the share capital has taken place. No permission is acquired, if the share 
capital has been raised to equal the amount, which it was lowered 
(Järvenoja 1997: 20). 
 
2) Maximum amount of dividends which may be decided by General Meet-
ing: 
a) OYL laws concerning the amount of distributed profits. 
b) Certificate of incorporation may include certain regulations. 
c) The proposal made by the board of directors is binding, however 
there are certain exceptions. 
 
3) There are restrictions concerning the minimum amount of dividends, 
which may be distributed. These are: 
a) Regulation in the certification of incorporation, which oblige the 
company to the distribution of profits. 
b) Minority shareholders demand for minority payment dividends. 
(Kyläkallio et al. 2002: 889 – 890.)  
 
The board of directors proposes a decision, which is either accepted or aban-
doned by the General Meeting. They hold the final power over the dividend 
payment decision, since they can deny such payments, and they also hold the 
power to change the board of directors. Dividend payouts that are not accepted 
or proposed by the board of directors are invalid, and these payments may not 
be fulfilled. In the case of payment in this case it will be called illegal distribu-
tion of profits. (Kyläkallio et al. 2002: 883).  
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Dividend payments may also be needed to be cancelled. There are certain regu-
lations that explain when this is needed to be done, or has to be done. Mainly 
these decisions should be made in situations. That require that the equity does 
not diminish. Cancellations may be made: the amount of dividends is too large 
according to the regulations of OYL, the decision making has not been done 
according to the law or there has been something else that is not done according 
to the OYL, the company has made losses and the liquidity of the company is at 
risk, or the decision has not been made according the official last fiscal years 
confirmed balance sheet. (Järvenoja 1997: 40.)  
 
Actual dividends are paid through the Finnish Central Securities Depository, 
which has archives of all the stockowners. Companies may receive the registers 
of those stockowners, which should be paid, or they can purchase such a ser-
vice from financial institutions. Dividends will have to be paid before 13.00 or 
exactly at 13.00 during the decided dividend payment day. Registering takes 
three days, therefore for example a dividend payment that is made during 
Wednesday which is the cum-dividend day will have an ex-dividend day dur-
ing Friday, since it takes three days to register the transfer of the actual owner-
ship. These rules are all stated in FCSD (Finnish Central Security Deposit) or 
APK (the Arvopaperikeskus) regulations 3.3.14, which deals about the profit 
payments in the OM-system. (Arvopaperikeskus 2007.) 
 
4.3. Quantity of distributable profits 
 
There are strong regulations to the amount of cash that companies may distrib-
ute among the shareholders. According to legislation the maximum and mini-
mum amount that can be paid is decided upon the last completed fiscal years 
balance sheet, which has to be confirmed. Maximum amount that may be paid 
out can be 8 percent of the total equity. (Järvenoja 1997: 18). It could be said that 
the minority shareholders create the minimum amount of dividends, which 
must be paid, however the certification of incorporation may include minimum 
amount, and it has to be followed by the board of directors. (Kyläkallio et al. 
2002: 881) 
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Permission to distribute profits through dividends is decided from the latest 
fiscal years contribution margin, no other years contribution margin may be 
used. In the case the company uses other than the latest fiscal years contribution 
margin, it will be called illegal distribution of profits. (Kyläkallio et al. 2002: 
883)  
 
Payout decision may only be made so large that it does not exceed the equity 
after subtracting losses and other undistributable parts. These undistributable 
parts include: 
1) Activated costs of founding. 
2) Share capital, which has been acquired by parent company or the com-
pany. 
3) Other amounts, which have been transferred according to articles of as-
sociation into reserve funds or other funds that cannot be distributed. 
(Järvenoja 1997: 16 – 17). 
 
Role of the board of directors demands that if there has been major change in 
the prospects of the firm or it has made losses that they cannot accept dividend 
payments, which cannot be defended after the change in their situation. This 
regulation is one of those that protect the creditors’ stake in the corporations. 
(Kyläkallio et al. 2002: 883).  
 
4.4. Minority shareholders portion  
 
According to the legislation General Meeting usually decides upon the amount 
of dividends. This rule may also be passed however, if the minority sharehold-
ers demand their legal right of minority dividends. The maximum amount of 
dividends that may be demanded by the minority rights are 50 percent from the 
latest fiscal years distribution, which are found in the balance sheet. There are 
certain regulations, which may lower or totally nullify the maximum amount, 
which the minority shareholder may demand. There are strong regulations to 
the amount of cash that companies may distribute among the shareholders. 
(Kyläkallio et al. 2002: 882, 897, 899, 901).   
 
Minority shareholders need to consist of an individual or a group of share-
holder that own at least one tenth of the shares or the required minimum 
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amount in the articles of association. This demand has to be made in the actual 
General Meeting before the decision making concerning the use of profits 
(Järvenoja 1997: 17 – 18).  All the limitation in the law that prohibit the use cer-
tain parts of profits to be dividend may lead into a situation where the minority 
shareholders dividends are only a small amount of the total profits that were 
made during the last fiscal year. (Kyläkallio et al. 2002: 900.) 
 
4.5. Changes in the Finnish taxation 
 
In May 2004 the Finnish government announced its proposal for the reform of 
corporate and capital taxation. The proposal included altering the taxation of 
dividend income by giving up the imputation system, which meant that the 
company that issued the dividend paid the tax on the behalf of the investor so 
that it was taxed only once, and making a transition to partial double taxation.  
This new system required that companies pay taxes for their profits and the 
shareholders will also have to pay tax for the dividend, hence the name double 
taxation. The law was adopted by the Finnish parliament in July 2004. This 
means that the taxation system becomes more complex and open to interpreta-
tion. The new regulations were applied for the first time in the taxation of divi-
dend income in 2005. (Rasinaho & Taajamaa: 2006.) 
 
The imputation system of corporate tax was in conflict with the regulations of 
the European Union. According to the EU article 58.3 the national tax legislation 
cannot be a way of arbitrary discrimination, and there should not be any obsta-
cles in the movement of capital inside the union. The European Community 
court deemed it as discriminating because domestic and foreign shareholders 
were not treated equally by the system. Court decision was made after the Fin-
nish government had agreed upon new dividend tax legislation. Finnish inves-
tors were better off with respect to taxation when they invested in Finnish 
shares instead of foreign ones.  (Juusela 2004: 34.) 
 
The new tax system means that the taxation of domestic dividend income has 
become more severe for the individual stockholders. In case of publicly held 
companies, for a private individual 70 percent of the dividend income is liable 
to taxation from which he or she is taxed after the capital income tax base which 
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is 28 percent. So the tax burden of an individual investor is 19.6 percent (70 per-
cent x 28 percent) of the dividend income. 30 percent of the income is com-
pletely tax-free. Capital gains will also be taxed at 28 percent. The total taxation 
of dividends will be 40.5 percent, which is made from the taxes paid by the 
stockowner and the company. Example: 
                    2006 2005 
Profit   100   100 
Taxation   26%   26% 
Profit after tax   74   74 
 
Dividends    74   74 
70% (2006) under tax    51.8    
57% (2005) under tax     42.18 
Taxes    14.5   11.81 
 
Total taxes:    40.5%   37.81% 
 (Koponen 2004: 173 – 179.)  
 
Before 2005 dividends were taxed at 29 percent, but the domestic shareholder 
received the tax back due to the imputation system. There was a transition pe-
riod into the new system in the year 2005. During that year, 43 percent of the 
income was free of tax and 57 percent was liable to it. The actual taxation dur-
ing 2005 is therefore 37.81% percent (26% company tax plus 11.81% individual). 
(Leppiniemi 2004: 72.) Thus the new system has been at full use since the be-
ginning of year 2007.  
 
Owners of the non-listed companies are allowed up to 90 000 Euros worth of 
dividend income tax-free. There are however regulations, which require that 
the company’s mathematical value has to be 1 000 000 Euros, in order for the 
individual can receive full tax benefit. All dividend payments that are higher 
than 9 percent of the mathematical value of the company will be taxed as nor-
mal income. (Verohallinto 2004.)  
 
Under the new regime, in some cases dividends received by companies would 
become subject to tax. But generally dividends received by corporate entities 
are tax-exempt. If a Finnish company receives dividends from a company not 
residing in the EU, the dividend is taxable income for the Finnish company 
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(Rasinaho & Taajamaa 2006).  In these situations tax treaties may limit Finland's 
taxation rights. The new act reduces the taxation of companies’ profits from 29 
to 26 percent, thus the government tries to protect growth companies and main-
tain Finnish company headquarters and production in the country (Teollisuus 
ja Työnantajat 2004: 3–4). Dividend taxation is very much a current affair in the 
world of finance. In the United States, the tax act of 2003 brought substantial tax 
relief with respect to dividend income. 
 
Under the new tax regime of the capital gain income was raised by one percent 
from 28 to 29. According to the Finnish government this was done, so that indi-
viduals with mortgage would not suffer more taxes. Under the Finnish tax sys-
tem the interest of the mortgage create a deficit in the capital income of these 
individuals. The compensation for the deficit is made according to the capital 
gain income tax, therefore lowering the taxation would actually increase taxa-
tion of such individuals. (Koponen 2004: 14) 
 
Dividends received by Finnish companies are generally free of tax. This means 
that they have a big tax benefit on dividends in comparison with individual 
investors. When non listed corporations receive dividends from listed corpora-
tions they will have to pay taxes on 75 percent of such income, if they own at 
least 10 percent of the company they will not have to pay taxes. Listed compa-
nies do not have to pay taxes when receiving dividends from other listed com-
panies. Accordingly receiving listed companies may prefer dividends instead of 
capital gains. (Koponen 2004: 180.) It is possible that managers have to take a 
close look on the structure of their share owners’ tax status before making deci-
sions on their dividend policies. There is clearly a conflict of interest between 
individual and corporate shareholders, due to which it will be interesting to see 
if the change of tax regime causes changes in dividend payments.   
 
4.6. Individual stockowner  
 
Finnish individuals mostly buy stocks for long time periods, and number of 
people saying this was found to be 91 percent (2005) and 87 (2006). Many 
households 46.7 percent (2005) and 49.5 (2006) informed that they owned 
stocks.  Many households have invested in other investment opportunities, and 
the largest amounts of investments are in equity funds that are managed by 
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banks or other investment companies. Only 25 percent of total investments had 
been invested directly into stocks during 2006. (Pörssisäätiö 2005; Pörssisäätiö 
2006.) 20 percent of the Finnish investors held stocks of the company, which 
they worked for during 2003 (Pörssisäätiö 2003). The low amount of stock own-
ership is caused by the high amount of money that has been placed in houses 
and summer cabins. The amount of that money invested in these households is 
67 percent in Finland, which is quite high compared to European average  of47 
percent or 27 percent in the United States.  This is also seen as one of the major 
components of risk along with the low amount of stocks that Finnish private 
persons own. The average Finnish stock owners have not diversified their in-
vestments. (Böckerman 2004: 15 – 16) 
 
According to Böckerman (2004: 13 – 34) major part of the Finnish private per-
sons, which own stock are wealthy and have a university degree. The major 
reason behind this is that following stock investments requires certain knowl-
edge, which this group of people already has.  During 1998 only 5 percent of the 
total amount of privately held wealth was invested in stocks. This number is 
higher when looking at older person e.g. 55 – 64 year olds owned 8 percent. It 
was also noted that young 25 – 34 year old office workers are anomaly, since 
they own more stocks compared to other groups. 
 
Private investors are minority owners in Finnish companies. During 1995 pri-
vate investors owned more stocks per percentage term by owning 17.1 percents, 
however this figure has diminished during the years and during 2000 it was 
only 8.4 percent. The private owners are noted to be larger owners in smaller 
Finnish companies. Most of the larger international Finnish companies such as 
Nokia, TeliaSonera and Nordea are mostly held by foreign investors, if Nokia’s 
ownership was out ruled the foreign ownership in Finnish stock markets would 
only be 32 percent. Private investors hold more of the small and risky compa-
nies, and have poorly diversified portfolios only 11.7 percent hold portfolio of 
five or more stocks. (Karhunen & Keloharju 2000: 189 – 195, 216 – 218) 
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5. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA GATHERING  
 
Research data was formed by Finnish corporations, which were listed during 
the study period on the main list. Data was received from the OMX exchange 
databases. The study is concentrated on the effect of dividends payments on 
stock prices, therefore there were small differences between the different years 
since some firms started payments while others stopped paying dividends. Re-
search was done on data gathered throughout the years of 2001 to 2007. The 
purpose was to have several years of data before the actual change and few 
years after, since during 2005 the tax change was not fully in place this year had 
only a slight change in taxation, therefore the study was concentrated on com-
paring the years between 2001 until 2004 with 2006 until 2007. There are also 
statistics with comparison between 2001 until 2004 with 2005 until 2007. The 
data was collected with similar fashion to Sorjonen (2000) and Liljeblom et al. 
(2001) by choosing only those firms which had at least 15 days of trading dur-
ing the -60 to -5 day period, which was used to calculate market returns and 
volatilities. Those firms, which were thinly traded were dropped from the data. 
Total amount of accepted dividend payments was 615 during the whole period, 
with least amount on the 2007 with only 70 observations and most during 2004 
with 112 observations. This was also the first year when the market knew about 
the change and large number of firms paid extra dividends because of the 
change. The 2007 data was a little bit smaller compared to others, since the data 
was used from the beginning of the year, however most dividends are paid dur-
ing this time. Data did not include sufficient amount of opening data to perform 
studies with those data, therefore the study was performed by only using clos-
ing price data. The data sets were narrowed down and as we can see from Table 
8 the skewness figures were quite high 6.48, 6.52 and 9.43, which are beneath 
one in the narrow sample. It can be said that the figures that are beneath one 
follow the normal distribution (Morgan, Leech, Gloeckner, Barrett 2004: 46 – 47, 
49). Similar chances can be found between the other two pairs of data sets in the 
Table 9 with the whole sample and in the Table 10 with narrow figures going 
from greatly above one two underneath one, also in the Table 11 and Table 12.  
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics of variables for Sorjonen equation, narrow sam-
ple 
448 58.89142 .24111 59.13253 19.57584 15.63623 244.492 .667 .115
448 87.74395 .15080 87.89475 23.41858 18.26366 333.561 .974 .115
448 71.11667 -6.91708 64.19959 19.42678 15.97572 255.224 .728 .115
Sorjonen
dO
Sorjonen_m_adj
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
Deviation
Variance Skewness
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics of variables for Sorjonen equation whole sample 
 
615 1324.953 -22.98215 1301.971 51.21038 103.8318 10781.036 6.475 .099
615 1288.115 .15080 1288.266 44.17012 73.11508 5345.815 9.437 .099
615 1324.337 -23.27606 1301.061 50.60035 103.5265 10717.737 6.524 .099
Sorjonen
dO
Sorjonen_m_adj
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
Deviation
Variance Skewness
 
Data used for the Sorjonen formula has been demonstrated in the Tables 7 and 
8. In Table 7 is data from all of the years 2001 to 2007 with the narrow sample 
and Table 8 is the same for the whole sample. There were some dividend pay-
ments and prices that changed only slightly, which created huge numbers for 
the formulas such outliers were removed. 
 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics of variables for Bell & Jenkinson equation 
whole sample, 2001 – 2004 compared to 2005 – 2007  
615 1.03766 -.03766 1.00000 .0527474 .07968807 .006 8.780 .099
615 .45174 .00280 .45455 .0490295 .03645932 .001 4.190 .099
615 1.04829 -.03882 1.00947 .0519637 .08007836 .006 8.766 .099
BJ
DP
BJ1
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic
Std.
Error
N Range Minimu
m
Maximu
m
Mean Std.
Deviation
Varianc
e
Skewness
 
 
Table 10. Descriptive statistics of variables for Bell & Jenkinson equation nar-
row sample, 2001 – 2004 compared to 2005 – 2007  
527 .09970 .00030 .10000 .0403986 .0237377 .001 .496 .106
527 .10761 .00280 .11042 .0420638 .0186730 .000 .634 .106
527 .10459 .00002 .10461 .0399492 .0236408 .001 .550 .106
BJ
DP
BJ1
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statist
ic
Std.
Error
N Range Minimum Maximu
m
Mean Std.
Deviation
Varianc
e
Skewness
 
 
Table 11. Descriptive statistics of variables for Bell & Jenkinson equation 
whole sample, 2001 – 2004 compared to 2006 – 2007  
524 1.03750 -.03750 1.00000 .0559527 .08513428 .007 8.348 .107
524 .27653 .00280 .27933 .0500284 .03382891 .001 2.677 .107
524 1.04745 -.03798 1.00947 .0551864 .08563910 .007 8.312 .107
BJ
DP
BJ1
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
Deviation
Variance Skewness
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Table 12. Descriptive statistics of variables for Bell & Jenkinson equation nar-
row sample, 2001 – 2004 compared to 2006 – 2007  
446 .09970 .00030 .10000 .0416235 .02426963 .001 .435 .116
446 .10761 .00280 .11042 .0430302 .01913655 .000 .554 .116
446 .10459 .00002 .10461 .0411722 .02413285 .001 .496 .116
BJ
DP
BJ1
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statist
ic
Std.
Error
N Range Minimu
m
Maximu
m
Mean Std.
Deviation
Variance Skewness
 
 
There are four different Tables of the descriptive statistics data used for the Bell 
& Jenkinson (2002) formulas, since the study was conducted on two different 
sets of years 2001 to 2004 which was compared with 2005 to 2007 and 2006 to 
2007. The Table 9 includes the descriptive statistics of the whole data for all the 
years, and Table 10 for the same years with narrow sample and the outliers are 
picked out from the data. Tables 11 and 12 are the same for the second study 
period of 2001 to 2004 compared with 2006 and 2007. The first Table 11 includes 
the descriptive statistics for the whole sample with years 2001 to 2004 and 2006 
to 2007, and the Table 12 includes the same for the narrow sample. 
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6. EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
The equation (16) used by Sorjonen (2000) in his research was used to calculate 
the ex-ratios shown in Table 13, the market adjustment was done by using the 
equation (23). The values in the plain sample are quite high 1.139 for the 2001 – 
2004 and 1.011 for 2005 – 2007, and 1.031 for 2006 – 2007. These values might be 
high, since the data might include some outliers. The actual figures for the nar-
rowed sample give better picture of the situation. The plain narrow sample for 
the first period 2001 – 2004 gave 0.79 and with market adjustment 0.78. These 
ratios are quite similar to the ones found by Liljeblom et al. (2001) and Hietala 
(1990) with the average found on the Finnish market being close to 0.80. Com-
paring these two different periods of tax change 2005 – 2007 and 2006 – 2007 
does not give us indications of the tax change having a major affect on the mar-
ket, since the figures are slightly different for the two periods with the plain 
sample 0.741 for the 2005 – 2007 and 0.729 for the 2006 – 2007. Comparing the 
market adjusted figures 0.765 for 2005 – 2007 and 0.78 for 2006 – 2007 there 
seems to be no real change in the ex-dividend day ratios between the two pe-
riods. Changes between plain and market adjusted narrow samples are going 
into separate direction during 2001 – 2004 to 2006 – 2007. In the plain narrow 
sample the ex-dividend day ratios are going down and in the market adjusted 
one the change seems to have changed direction, so that after the tax change the 
dividends are seen with higher value than before. 
 
 
 
(16) 
 
 
(23) 
 
 
Tax change affect seems vague looking at the ex-ratios show in the Table 13.  
The ex-ratios of the big sample all indicate that the ex-ratios fell. The figures 
drop from clearly above one to close to one. Strongest change can be seen when 
looking at the 2001 – 2004 compared with 2005 – 2007 with the ex-ratios going 
from 0.79 to 0.741 in the plain sample and 0.78 to 0.765 for the market adjusted 
* m
e e c eP P P Rβ= −
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ratios. The change is not significant when looking at the market adjusted ratios. 
It is clear that there seems to be no difference, since the values are exactly the 
same after ruling out the problematic year of 2005. 
 
Table 13. Sorjonen ex-dividend day ratios of Finnish Ex-Day ratios 
 
Results given by the Bell and Jenkinson equation (22) and (24) do not yield simi-
lar picture, which was seen using the Sorjonen equation, the equation (20) has 
no constant, whereas in the equation (21) the constant is included. Dummy 
variables were used in equations (22) and (24), so that PreTax2004 and Post-
Tax2004 were given value of 0 and 1 depending on the period of observation. 
Looking at the big sample in the Table 15 and narrow sample can be seen from 
Table 14, we can see similar picture with Sorjonen, since all the numbers seem 
Sorjonen
Big Sample 2001-2004 2005-2007 2006-2007
β 1,139 1,011 1,031
Std Error 0,041 0,027 0,036
DF 362 253 162
R2 0,68 0,849 0,837
T 27,712 37,714 28,756
p-value 0,000 0,000 0,000
β-Market Adjusted 1,133 0,997 1,017
Std Error 0,041 0,024 0,031
R2 0,677 0,873 0,873
T 27,477 41,557 33,226
p-value 0,000 0,000 0,000
Narrow Sample 2001-2004 2005-2007 2006-2007
β 0,79 0,741 0,729
Std Error 0,025 0,023 0,029
DF 247 201 129
R2 0,802 0,84 0,828
T 31,556 32,386 24,839
p-value 0,000 0,000 0,000
β-Market Adjusted 0,78 0,765 0,78
Std Error 0,025 0,022 0,028
R2 0,802 0,861 0,861
T 31,534 35,145 28,159
p-value 0,000 0,000 0,000
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to have fallen for the latter period after the tax change. There is noticeable dif-
ference, since the ex-ratio differences do not change when looking at the narrow 
sample. Ratios do not indicate a change as strong that can be seen in the whole 
sample. In the plain big sample (see Table 14) with constant there seems to be 
small change with the two periods going from 0.814 to 0.77, and the change just 
goes lower when the constant is taken out with 0.937 dropping to 0.935, for 
these periods the differences are -0.044 for the plain sample with constant and -
0.002 without the constant. Differences witnessed here are -0,025 for the market 
adjusted with the constant term and the actual ex-ratios are 0.826 for the period 
before and 0.801 for the period after the tax change. When using the market ad-
justed figures with no constant the whole change seems to have just gone 
backwards with the figures going slightly higher on the second period from 
0.927 to 0.935 for the latter period, which indicated a difference of 0.008.  
 
 
(20) 
 
(21) 
 
(22)
 
  
 
(24) 
 
Dropping out the 2005 year and only looking at years 2001 to 2004 compared 
with 2006 to 2007 the change seems to be even smaller. The whole sample gives 
similar picture to the 2001 to 2004 compared with 2005 and 2007, but as can be 
seen from the Table 16 the changes in the narrow sample are very small be-
tween the two periods. The regressions for the big sample are show in the Table 
17. Only changes which are going according to the tax hypothesis are the plain 
and market adjusted ratios with constant (see table 16). For the plain sample the 
ratio goes from 0.793 to 0.749 indicating a statistically significant difference of -
0.044 and with the market adjustment from 0.808 to 0.791, which has difference 
of -0.017 and this is also statistically significant. The interceptors have been 
noted to remove biases caused in the results as can be seen from research con-
*( ) ( )c e i i i
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ducted by Bell et al. (2002: 1337). Boyd et al. (1994) and Frank et al. (1998) have 
developed microstructure models of ex-day trading behavior and found the 
interceptors to be negative. It has been said that these might have effects on 
producing biased estimates of the slope coefficients. This might be the case in 
this study, since the results change direction when the interceptors are included 
in the equation. Before using the interceptors the difference between the both 
periods is negative without year 2005 the difference is -0,025 and 2005 included 
0,008, and after it turns from 0,017 without year 2005 and -0,025 when the year 
2005 is included. We can therefore conclude that statistically significant effect 
can be witnessed in the markets, which support tax hypotheses.  
 
Results that are show have indication of 5 percent (10 percent) significance level 
with ** (*), this is used in all of the tables, differences that have no ** (*) are not 
significant at all. 
 
Table 14. Bell & Jenkinson ex-dividend day ratios of Finnish Ex-Day ratios, 
2001 – 2004 compared to 2005 – 2007 Narrow sample 
 
Bell & Jenkinson
Narrow Sample 2001-2004 2005-2007
Interceptor β-Pre β-Post Diff.
Plain 0,07 0,814 0,77 -0,044**
Std Error 0,043 0,058 0,018
DF 526 526
T 19,131 13,162
R2 0,413
Plain - 0,937 0,935 -0,002**
Std Error 0,021 0,031 0,018
T 44,564 30,097
R2 0,846
Market Adjusted 0,06 0,826 0,801 -0,025**
Std Error 0,042 0,058 0,018
DF 526 526
T 19,737 13,918
R2 0,427
Market Adjusted - 0,927 0,935 0,008**
Std Error 0,021 0,03 0,018
R2 0,579
T 44,939 30,715
R2 0,849
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Table 15. Bell & Jenkinson ex-dividend day ratios of Finnish Ex-Day ratios, 
2001 – 2004 compared to 2005 – 2007 Big sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16. Bell & Jenkinson ex-dividend day ratios of Finnish Ex-Day ratios, 
2001 – 2004 compared to 2006 – 2007 Narrow sample 
 
Bell & Jenkinson
Big Sample 2001-2004 2005-2007
Interceptor β-Pre β-Post Diff.
Plain 0,021 0,799 0,341 -0,458**
Std Error 0,085 0,122 0,074
DF 614 614 614
T 9,395 2,792
R2 0,13
Plain - 1,055 0,662 -0,393**
Std Error 0,058 0,095 0,075
T 18,041 6,975
R2 0,379
Market Adjusted 0,02 0,801 0,341 -0,460**
Std Error 0,085 0,123 0,075
DF 614 614 614
T 9,368 2,773
R2 0,13
Market Adjusted - 1,046 0,648 -0,398**
Std Error 0,059 0,095 0,076
T 17,825 6,806
R2 0,373
Bell & Jenkinson
Narrow Sample 2001-2004 2006-2007
Interceptor β-Pre β-Post Diff.
Plain 0,08 0,793 0,749 -0,044**
Std Error 0,047 0,069 0,019
DF 445 445
T 16,885 10,79
R2 0,395
Plain - 0,937 0,945 0,008**
Std Error 0,022 0,04 0,019
T 42,819 23,348
R2 0,843
Market Adjusted 0,07 0,808 0,791 -0,017**
Std Error 0,046 0,068 0,019
DF 445 445
T 17,553 11,624
R2 0,412
Market Adjusted - 0,927 0,952 0,025**
Std Error 0,021 0,04 0,019
T 43,358 24,087
R2 0,847
69 
 
  
Table 17. Bell & Jenkinson ex-dividend day ratios of Finnish Ex-Day ratios, 
2001 – 2004 compared to 2006 – 2007 Big sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1. Ex-dividend ratios based on dividend payments 
 
This addition study was conducted on three different types of dividend paying 
firms low, medium and high. This was done to gain deeper understanding on 
how dividend amount had affected the ex-day ratios, and to test the hypothesis. 
These groups were based on the study conducted by Niemi (2004), where the 
companies were placed in three groups of stocks depending on their payments. 
The three groups were defined as follows: low those who paid under 2.5 per-
cent of dividends, medium those who paid between 2.5 and 5 percent and high 
those were the ones paying higher than 5 percent of stock price as dividends. 
Using these same groups ex-dividend day ratios were calculated using Sorjonen 
(2000) and Bell et al. (2002). 
 
Results given by the different groups clearly give a better picture of how the 
taxes have affected market valuation of stocks. The Sorjonen equation had a 
slight down fall using these groups, since the low dividend paying stocks was 
quite small after ruling out the year 2005. The figures given in the Table 18 con-
cerning the low paying stocks would clearly indicate that the low paying stocks 
Bell & Jenkinson
Big Sample 2001-2004 2006-2007
Interceptor β-Pre β-Post
Plain 0,016 0,853 0,568 -0,285**
Std Error 0,104 0,227 0,08
DF 614
T 8,129 2,503
R2 0,124
Plain - 1,055 0,954 -0,101**
Std Error 0,062 0,161 0,08
T 16,96 5,906
R2 0,382
Market Adjusted 0,02 0,865 0,610 -0,255**
Std Error 0,105 0,228 0,08
DF 614
T 8,271 2,674
R2 0,125
Market Adjusted - 1,046 0,955 -0,091**
Std Error 0,062 0,162 0,08
T 16,752 5,889
R2 0,377
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changed strongly after the tax change to the opposite direction than the tax hy-
pothesis suggests. The figures went from 0.549 to 0.76 for the plain sample, and 
from 0.266 to 1.004 for the market adjusted ratio, however the 0.266 ex-ratio is 
not significant. The two other groups behaved according to the tax hypothesis. 
The medium group gave ex-ratio of 0.692 before tax change and 0.637 after it, 
for the high group ex-ratio of 0.813 was found before and ex-ratio of 0.663 after 
the tax change. These ex-ratios would indicate that for the medium and high 
dividend paying stocks the dividend valuation had changed. The market ad-
justed values do not show the same change as strongly for the medium paying 
with 0.705 changing into 0.696 during the later period, which would indicate 
that there was some change, but not a strong one. For the high paying stock the 
change turns around when looking at the market adjusted ratios, since before 
tax change the ex-ratio was 0.789 and after tax period ex-ratio was 0.775. There 
is a problem with the high ratio, since the data did not include more than 11 
observations for the period after the tax change. It seems on whole that the re-
sults given by Sorjonen equation were showing strong tax affect until market 
adjustment was done and afterwards there were only small changes. The trend 
was however according to the hypotheses as the ex-ratios fell for medium and 
high dividend paying stocks. 
 
Table 18. Sorjonen ex-dividend day ratios of Finnish Ex-Day ratios, , compari-
son of low, medium and high yielding stocks 
 
Sorjonen
Low Medium High
2001-2004 2006-2007 2001-2004 2006-2007 2001-2004 2006-2007
β 0,549** 0,76** 0,692** 0,637** 0,813** 0,663**
Std. Error 0,165 0,184 0,062 0,071 0,070 0,086
DF 35 17 109 76 86 11
R2 0,239 0,502 0,535 0,514 0,611 0,845
T 3,319 4,140 11,197 8,973 11,625 7,730
β-Market Adjusted 0,266 1,004** 0,705** 0,696** 0,789** 0,775**
Std. Error 0,175 0,233 0,061 0,065 0,071 0,107
DF 35 17 109 76 86 11
R2 0,062 0,737 0,552 0,774 0,538 0,826
T 1,515 4,501 11,582 10,650 11,083 7,218
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It seems as the problems associated with the use of the Sorjonen (2000) equation 
can be avoided by using the Bell et al. (2002) equation. There are more valid 
observations for the equation; however the equation uses dummies, which do 
not indicate how many observations fall into each tax period. There were 31 
observations for the high dividend paying stocks after the tax change and 123 
observations for the period before change. For the medium there are 133 obser-
vations before and 97 after the tax change. The low paying stocks had 41 obser-
vations after the tax change and 53 observations for the period before change. 
 
Low dividend paying stocks gave very low ex-ratios for both of the samples. It 
seems there is some difficulty using the constant as Sorjonen (2000) has men-
tioned when using the close-close prices. All of the plain ratios for the plain 
sample without constant act according to the tax hypothesis and fall down after 
the change, however the high dividend paying stocks do so only slightly by 
falling from 0.954 to 0.945 with a difference of -0.009, which is statistically sig-
nificant, the results can be seen in the Table 19. There is clearly a very high ex-
ratio of 1.225 for the 2001 – 2004 for the low paying stocks the ex-ratio is 1.028 
after doing the market adjustment. The marked adjusted ratios of the high pay-
ing stocks change opposite to the hypothesis, when marked adjusted figures are 
used with the interceptor. The high paying stocks behave oddly since both of 
the marked adjusted figures are going opposite to the tax hypotheses by having 
negative effect with ex-ratio being higher after the change.  Both the low and 
medium paying stocks follow the tax hypothesis by going down in the latter 
period. The ratios for the low paying stocks with marked adjustment changes 
from 1.028 to 0.850 difference is -0.178 and for the medium the change is from 
1.016 to 0.938 with difference of -0.078, both results are statistically significant. 
Results from the market adjusted low ratios included the interceptor are not 
significant, however without the interceptor the results are according to the hy-
potheses and are significant at the five percent level for the low ratios. The me-
dium dividend paying stocks have statistically significant affect with and with-
out the interceptor when using market adjusted ratios and these are both signif-
icant at the five percent level.  
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Table 19. Bell & Jenkinson ex-dividend day ratios of Finnish Ex-Day ratios, 
comparison of low, medium and high yielding stocks 
Bell & Jenksinson
Constant Low Medium High
2001- 2006- 2001- 2006- 2001- 2006-
2004 2007 2004 2007 2004 2007
Interc. β-Pre β-Post Diff. Interc. β-Pre β-Post Diff. Interc. β-Pre β-Post Diff.
Plain 0,019 0,145 0,01 -0,135 -0,009 1,265 1,172 -0,093** -0,002 0,975 0,969 -0,006**
Std. Error 0,008 0,457 0,406 0,020 0,008 0,203 0,216 0,021 0,006 0,134 0,268 0,023
DF 94 229 154
R2 0,004 0,150 0,263
T 0,317 0,025 6,226 5,423 7,299 5,784
Market Adj. 0,014 0,251 0,167 -0,084 -0,009 1,246 1,181 -0,065** 0,001 0,932 0,951 0,019**
Std. Error 0,007 0,427 0,377 0,018 0,008 0,201 0,217 0,021 0,080 0,140 0,176 0,024
DF 94 229 154
R2 0,004 0,147 0,226
T 0,593 0,442 6,196 5,521 6,634 5,400
No Low Medium High
Constant 2001- 2006- 2001- 2006- 2001- 2006-
2004 2007 2004 2007 2004 2007
β-Pre β-Post β-Pre β-Post β-Pre β-Post
Plain - 1,225 0,96 -0,265** - 1,038 0,932 -0,106** - 0,954 0,945 -0,009**
Std. Error 0,163 0,156 0,020 0,047 0,058 0,021 0,028 0,076 0,023
DF 94 229 154
R2 0,504 0,756 0,945
T 7,537 6,137 22,019 16,009 33,621 12,046
Market Adj. - 1,028 0,85 -0,178** - 1,016 0,938 -0,078** - 0,949 0,971 0,022**
Std. Error 0,018 0,021 0,024
DF 94 229 154
R2 0,47 0,704 0,883
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS   
 
The hypothesis has to be rejected, since there was difference to the opposite di-
rection found in the high dividend paying stocks when using the Bell & Jenkin-
son equation, while Sorjonen did show evidence of small affect the sample size 
was too small. This might be true, since the individual stock owners owned one 
fifth of the stocks, and this number has been decreasing rapidly, therefore it is 
quite clear that the impact of tax changes to this group is only going to have a 
slight impact on the markets. This owner group has been found to own stocks 
for long time periods. They are only a minor part of the traders in the markets 
with their 18 percent ownership on all of the stocks. Owners of high paying 
stocks may not be individual investors, or other vice they would have not un-
derstood the effect of the tax change. There is a possibility that firms paying 
high dividends are owned more by other companies or by mutual funds. 
 
Results are however puzzling, the change in the valuation of the dividends 
should have been found in the high dividend paying groups instead it was 
found in the two groups that should not have been affected strongly. These 
stocks should have the least amount of affect due to their dividend size, which 
seems not to be the case. Perhaps the individual stock owners have not pre-
ferred high dividend paying stocks, instead they have owned the stocks which 
have paid only low and medium amount of dividends. The differences found 
between the ex-ratios of the whole market were found to act according to the 
tax hypotheses.  
 
The tick size effect was ruled out in the Finnish studies, because of the small 
size of ticks. Transaction costs and the thin trading might have caused the fig-
ures that we saw in the empirical part. The actual change in taxation might have 
had such a slight effect because of the reluctance of the individual shareholders 
towards active trading. The thin trading might cause that some stock might not 
be exploited for gains by the short-term traders, since there is no possibility to 
do so. The clientele of the Finnish companies might be homogeneous for some 
stocks, but even with these stocks the portion of individual owners might be the 
small, therefore the tax affect may be witnessed for the whole markets. Even 
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though the high dividend paying stock might not be affected, this might be an 
indication of ownership, or that the owners of these high dividend paying 
stocks are not active traders. Management might also have its part in the tax 
affect, and therefore changes of dividend payments are done slowly, which 
might have affected the amount of dividends. 
 
Results might be more visible if such study was conducted with a larger set of 
data after the tax change. The change should also be studied by separating 
those stocks that have gone down during the dividend payment and those that 
have risen during the same period.  The stocks could also be divided into dif-
ferent groups based on firm size.  
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